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Beneath the placid surface of books such as The
Adventures of Tom Sawyer and Adventures of Huckleberry Finn,
there are the seeds of a darker, yet more profound Twain than a
cursory reading yields.

From a point beginning about 1876 until

his death in 1910, there is in Twain's major works a progressively darker, more intensely pessimistic view of the human condition,
for Twain increasingly saw man as circumscribed and imprisoned
by mechanistic determinism.

This study provides a chronological

examination of Twain's attempt to resolve the problem of man's
sense of moral responsibility in a deterministic world.

The

development of Twain's thinking or man's conscience and determined
te.navior falls into three stages that fcrm the basis for the
three major chapters of this thesis.

In Twain's primary stage

he initially grappled with the problem of determinism and moral
responsibility.

In the second stage Twain recognized the control

determinism exercises and the guilt that socially engrained
conscience imposes on man, yet he still insisted on man's ability to rise above these things and impose his own concept of
morality.

In the final stage Twain relinquisned tne lingering

vestiges of his belief in man's control of his life and actions
and depicted man

as

unable to move above his guilt because of

circumstances he cannot control.

INTRODUCTION

Mention of the name Mark Twain still conjures up images
of barefoot, freckle-faced boys—with ragged overalls rolled to
the knee and straw hats on tousled hair--drifting lazily upon a
homemade raft on the Mississippi River on an idyllic summer
day.

Twain is variously called a "writer of boys' books" and

a major American humorist and "funny man."

However, critics

have more and more insisted that to see Twain as merely a purveyor of nostalgic glimpses of the past or as a comic is to
misread his so-called "boys' books" and misunderstand his humor
that so often yields pathos beneath the comic veneer. for Twain
cannot be analyzed, packaged, and shelved in so simplistic a
fashion.

Twain undeniably was a master of wt and humor, and

vividly recalls the joys of childhood to his reader, but he was
infinitely more than this as a writer.

Beneath the rlacid

surface of books such as The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, there are the seeds of a darker,
yet more profound Twain than a cursory reading yields.

From

a point beginning about 1876 until his death in 1910, In
Twain's major works critics have noted a progressively darker,
more intensely pessimistic view of the human condition, for
Twain increasingly saw man as a prisoner cf the moral sense
(the conscience), and yet he described mar.
imprisoned by mechanistic determinism.
1

As

circumscrItc-d and

2
The use of the term "mechanistic determinism" Is
appropriate in defining Twain's outlook on man in that Twain
came to believe that "whatever

A

man is, is due to his make,

and to the influences brought to bear upon it by his heredities, his habitat, his associations.

He is moved, directed,

1
COMMANDED, by exterior influences--solely."

Sherwood Cummings

has noted that "Mark Twain swam during his whole career in the
mainstream of ideas that produced the naturalistic writers."2
An Important factor in preparing the American mind for acceptance of the determinism that was central to the naturalistic
movement in the latter part of the nineteenth century was
Calvinistic predestination.
Twain, thoug,

Coleman C. Parsons notes that

'deniably influenced by Calvinism, "transformed

predestination into determinism"3 and Hyatt Waggoner has stated
that Twain "arrived at an unshakable belief in absolute
determinism: and his belief was scientifically grounded.

If

it was not inspired by science, it found, at any rate, ample
support therein, especially in the emphasis on heredity and
4
environment postulated by Darwin's theory of evolution."
1

Mark Twain, "What Is Man?" in What Is Man? and Other
Essays (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1917), P. 5.
All future citations to "What Is Man?" are from this volume and
are reference
only in the text.
-Sherwood Cummings, "What Is Man?: The Scientific Sources,"
in Essa:is on Determinism in American Literature, ed. Sydney J.
Krause (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1964), p. 114.
'Coleman O. Parsons, "The Devil and Samuel Clemens."
Virginia quarterly Review 23 (Autumn 1947): 591.
4
Alexander E. Jones, "Mark Twain and the Determinism of
'What Is Man?'," American Literature 24 (March 1957-January
1 05): 5.

3
Therefore, the primary interest of this discussion when dealing
with his determinism, will rest upon Twain's thinking in
conjunction with the mechanistic ideology of his time that led
eventually to naturalistic writing, rather than emphasizing the
metaphysical or religious ramifications of determinism.
This study will focus on representative works on the
genesis, development, and emergence in full bloom of Twain's
dual idea of man as a machine that must act as he does, and that
at the same time remains a creature accountable for his actions
by possessing what Twain interchangeably termed "the moral
sense" or the "conscience"--that is, man's ability to distinguish
right from wrong.

A chronological examination of Twain's

developing thinking on man's conscience and determined behavior
will be undertaken in three major chapters.

First. Twain's

primary stage in which he initially grappled with the problem of
determinism and moral responsibility will be considered in
"The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival of Crime In Connecticut" (1876), The Adventures of r,om Sawyer (1876), and The
Prince and the Pauper (1881).

In the second stage Twain recog-

nized the control determinism exercises and the guilt that
socially engrained conscience imposes on man, yet he still
insisted on man's ability to rise above these things and impose
his own concept of morality.

Adventures of Huckleberry Finn

(1884) will be discussed as the primary manifestation of this
stage.

Finally, the culmination of Twain's view,in which the

lingering vestiges of his belief in man's control of his life
and actions disappear and man becomes unable to move above his

4
guilt (because of circumstances he cannot control), will be
explored in the transitional Fudd'nhead Wilson (1894), in
"The Man that Corrupted Hadleyburg" (1899), "The Damned Human
Race" (1905-1909), "What Is Man?" (1906), "The Mysterious
Stranger" (1916), and "Letters From the Earth" (ready for
publication in 1939; suppressed by Clara Clemens Samossoud
until 1962).

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY THINKING: THE LINES ARE DRAWN

I felt a cleavage in my mind
As if my brain had split;
I tried to match it, seam by seam,
But could not make them fit.
The thought behind I strove to join
Unto the thought before,
Fut sequence ravelled out of reach
Like balls upon a floor.5
The preceding words by Emily Dickinson are uncannily
applicable to Mark Twain.

Over and over the "cleavage" of

Twain's thinking manifests itself in his works; his use of
twins, his contrasting of appearance with reality, and his
shifting attitude on God and immortality are tut a few of the
"splits" apparent in Twain's writing.

Theodore Dreiser as-

tutely counseled readers to Mark (observe) the Twain (two) in
Twain's works.6

Perhaps one of Twain's most interesting

dualities is the idea of man as a determined being whose life
and actions are completely manipulated and regulated by forces
beyond his control while paradoxically remaining accountable
for his actions because of his possession of the Moral Sense-the ability to distinguish righ* from wrong.

Edward Wagenknecht

5Emily Dickinson, The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson,
with an Introduction by Martha Dickinson Bianchi (Little,
Prown, and ('ompany, 1924), p. 57.
6Theodore Dreiser, "Mark the Double Twain," The English
Journal 24 (October 1935): 615.

5

6
precisely noted this division in Twain's thinking by saying:
"His deterministic philosophy being what it finally was, he
knew he had no right either to praise man or to blame him,
yet he went right on doing it just the same."7
Critics have long observed the darkening strands of
pessimistic determinism that run through Twain's works and
climax in his later writing.

Twain himself said in 1907:

°I have talked my gospel /peaking here specifically of the
determinism of "What Is Man?"7 rather freely in conv-sation
for twenty-five or thirty years and have never much minded
whether my listeners liked it or not."8

The purpose of this

study is to examine the works of those years wherein Twain
discussed not only his "gospel" of man's determinism, but also
expressed his parallel yet contrasting idea of man as possessor
of "the moral sense" or "conscience," to note the stages of
development his thought underwent, and to observe where the
"cleavage" in the mind of Twain ultimately led him in relation
to the question of man's moral responsibility in light of his
determined life.

What better place can an investigation of

this conflict begin than at that point at least a quarter of a
century previous to his statement of 1907 where Twain himself
admitted his deterministic thought began, and where also his
struggle with the moral accountability of man ensued: ushering
7Edmard Wagenknecht, Mark Twain: The Man and His Work.
3rd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1971). p. 10.
8Nark Twain in Eruption, cited by Alexander B. Jones,
"Mark Twain and the Determinism of 'What Is Man?'," American
Literature 24 (March 1957-January 1958): 2.

in this first stage of his developing thinking on conscience
and control was "The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival of
Crime in Connecticut."
Justin Kaplan notes that during the course of "The
Facts," Twain "tried to explain his feelings of duality and
conflict, of having a demon inside him.
conscience."9

He called this demon

In "The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival

of Crime in Connecticut," published in 1876, the reader is
introduced to a man whose conscience, by his own admission, was
"torpid.“10

This numbness and ineffectiveness of conscience,

that may tend to he overlooked at first, interestingly leads to
the eventual annihilation of conscience by the end of the tale.
Immediately after the unnamed narrator's proud statement of the
ineffectuality of his aunt's appeal to him to stop smoking, a
strange visitor entered the narrator's office uninvited and
unannounced.
Straightway the door opened, and a shriveled, shabby
dwarf entered. He was not more than two feet high. He
seemed to be about forty years old. Every feature ard
every inch of him was a trifle out of shape; and so, while
one could not put his finger upon any particular part and
say, "This is a conspicuous deformity," the spectator perceived that this little person was a deformity as a
whole--a vague, general, evenly blended, nicely adjusted
deformity. There was a foxlike cunning in the face and
sharp little eyes, and also alertness and malice. And
yet this vile bit of human ruttish seemed to bear a sort

9Justin Kaplan, Mr. Clemens and Mark Twain (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 341.
10Mark Twain. "The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival
of Crime in Connecticut." in Tom Sawyer Abroad, Tom Sawyer,
Detective and Cther Stories, Etc. Etc., Author's National
tdition. vol. 20 (New York: Harper & rothers Publishers, 1P96:
reprint ed., Grosse Pointe, Mich.: Scholarly Press. n.d.),
T. 305. All future citations to "The Facts" are from this
volume and are referenced only in the text.
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of remote and 111-defined resemblance to me: It was
dully perceptible in the mean form, the countenance, and
even the clothes, gestures, manner, and attitudes of the
creature. He was a farfetched, dim suggestion of a
burlesque upon me, a caricature of me in litne. One
thing about him struck me forcibly, and most unpleasantly:
he was covered all over with a fuzzy, greenish mold, such
as one sometimes sees upon mildewed bread. The sigh
of
it was nauseating. (pp. 306-307)
This ugly intruder persecuted the unsuspecting narrator
mercilessly about incidents, great and small, from the narrator's
past and did not hesitate to trespass into the narrator's
thoughts to incriminate him.

Through the height of thL impish

dwarf's questionings, the narrator suffered greater and greater
pangs of guilt while the dwarf seemed to thrive and grow more
bold with every hit on the narrator's points of vulnerability:
Remorse: Remorse: It seemed to me that it would eat
the very heart out of me: And yet that small fiend only
sat there leering at me with joy and contempt, and
placidly chuckling. Presently he began to speak again.
Every sentence was an accusation, and every accusation a
truth. Every clause was freighted with sarcasm and
derision, every slow -dropping word burned like vitriol.
(p. 310)
Finally the anguished narrator, declaring his belief that
his tormentor was the devil incarnate, cried out for the dwarf
to identify himself; whereupon the strange visitor replied:
"Well, I am your Conscience:"

(p. 312).

At this point to an

even greater extent than before, the narrator's moldy Conscience
showed his maliciousness and cruelty by referring to the
narrator as "my good slave" (p. 312) and to himself as the
narrator's "master" (p. 313) and "most pitiless enemy" (p. 314).
This "slave-master" imagery and the narrator's statement that
"my owner was still my prisoner" (p. 3)3) (referring to the

9
Imprisonment of the Conscience with his paradoxical "slave owner"--the narrator--In the locked room where they were
conversing) is vital.

While causing the narrator anguish over

his moral flaws, the spiteful two-foot dwarf was, at the same
time, relentlessly reminding the man that he was in subjection
to and controlled (determined) by his conscience.

When the man

unwittingly addressed the dwarf as "friend," this control was
clearly manifested as Conscience replied:
I am not your friend, I am your enemy; I am not your
equal, I am your master. Call me 'my lord,' If you
please. You are too familiar. (pp. 314-15)
Although the Conscience told the narrator "when we get
hold of a man of a peculiarly sensitive nature, oh, but we do
haze him!" (p. 316) he also said that a person may become callous
to the prods of his conscience after a period of intense goading,
and may lull the conscience to sleep and thereby stop its
influence and extinguish its power of inflicting guilt feelings
upon the possessor-slave of the conscience.
When the narrator's aunt appeared in his office, the
malignant Conscience was at first stunned and stupified because
of the guilt that weighted the narrator's heavy heart due to
her guilt-inducing questions and statements to the narrator.
At last the aunt's reproof centered on the point the narrator
revealed at the beginning of the story as being beyond the touch
of his lethargic conscience.

At this juncture the personified

Concience of the narrator, shrunken from its youthfu: seven-foot
t-eautiful stature to its present rerugnant two-foot slimy form
ty its possessor-slave's continual hardening tc all but a very
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few accessible points, sank to the floor in a profound sleep.
The narrator was gleeful:
With an exultant shout I sprang past my aunt, and in an
instant I had my lifelong foe by the throat. After so
many years of waiting and longing, he was mire at last.
I tore him to shreds and fragments. I rent the fragments
to bits. I cast the bleeding rubbish into the fire, and
drew into my nostrils the grateful incense of my burnt
offering. At last, and forever, my Conscience was dead!
(p. 324)
Van Wyck Frocks calls the story of the slaughter of
conscience "one of the most ferocious of his /TWa1n's7 tales."12
Alexander E. Jones says "this symbolic annihilation of Conscience
may have been emotionally satisfying to Twain when he composed
the sketch, but he eventually realized that his guilt complex
12
could not be resolved so easily."

Coleman 0. Parsons notes

that "the comic extreme of Clemens' wistful moral anarchy is
achieved in 'The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival of Crime
In Connecticut'; the author outlives his morbid scrupulousness
13
And slays his shrunken, persecuting Conscience."

Here, at the

conclusion of "The Facts," as Twain allowed the narrator as "a
man WITHOUT A CONSCIENCE:" (p. 325) to indulge in a rampage of
theft and murder completely without any form of remorse, the
preliminary stage of Twain's thinking on man's moral accountability reflects the possibility of the complete destruction of the
accusing conscience.

As Parsons notes, this is the "extreme"

and "wistful" beginning of Twain's thinking on conscience in a

"
Van Wyck Prooks, The Ordeal of Mark Twain (New York:
E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1933). p. 23.
12

Jones, p. 9.

"Parsons, "The Devil and Samuel Clemens." p.

C.

11
determined world, and he soon moved to the more realistic
position where socially engrained conscience prompted action.
Such is the case with Twain's 1876 publication of The
Adventures of Tom Sawyer.
Summarizing Robert Wiggins' thought in Mark Twain,
Jackleg Novelist, Milton Rickels notes Wiggins' comment that
Twain, as a believer in determinism, rejected the idea of the
moral responsibility and freedom of man while violating his
beliefs in some of his works by presenting characters "who
have moral choices and occasionally act moral1y.al4

Tom Sawyer

is such a character with moral obligations and actions.

A

romantic rogue, who is seen by many critics as an autobiographical sketch of Twain himself, Tom is not only the "gang's"
leader, but also, as Wiggins and Rickels note, a morally
responsible agent.
Tom's conscience or moral accountability is seen as

operative in two ways during the course of Tom Sawyer.

First,

Tom's conscience is seen in relation to his personal actions,
especially as they adversely affect women in the story.

The

reader is told that "Tom's heart smote him"15 when he inadvertently told Becky Thatcher of his previous "engagement" to Amy
Lawrence.

Later, again in a place where he sought the approval

-Milton Rickels, "Samuel Clemens and the Conscience of
Comedy," Southern Review 4 (April 1968): 564.
-mark Twain, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, Author's
National Edition, vol. 7 (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers.
1903: reprint ed., Grosse Pointe, Mich.: Scholarly Press, n.d.),
p. 89. All future citations to Tom Sawyer are from this volume
and are referenced only in the text.
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of Becky, Tom was plagued by his conscience as he realized
that his "use" of Amy to spite Becky would eventually lead
from Amy's "grateful happiness" to her rejection and despair
as soon as Becky was wooed back to his favor (p. 188).
In an attempt to escape the responsibility of commitments to the two girls and his Aunt Polly, Tom organized a
pirate escapade on Jackson's Island.

Once on the island.

however, Huck Finn, Joe Harper, and Tom Sawyer were visited
by one for whose appearance they were not prepared:
An intruder came, now, that would not "down." It was
conscienre. They began to feel a vague fear that they
had been doing wrong to run away; and next they thought
of the stolen meat, and then the real torture came.
They tried to argue it Away by reminding conscience that
they had purloined sweetmeats and apples scores of times;
but conscience was not to be appeased by such thin plausibilities; It seemed to them, in the end, that there was no
getting around the stubborn fact that taking sweetmeats
was only "hooking." while taking bacon and hams and such
valuables was plain simple stealing--and there was a commard against that in the Bible. So they inwardly resolved
that so long as they remained in the business, their
piracies should not again be sullied with the crime of
stealing. Then conscience granted a truce, and these
curiously inconsistent pirates fell peacefully to sleep.
pp. 1142-4'3)
Though the pangs of conscience arising from their
thievery were fairly easily dispelled, Tom and Joe were
geruinely concerned for the people at home who feared them
drowned after their sudden, unexplained disappearance.

Tom

stole away one night to return home and learn first hand of his
Aunt Polly's grief over his "death."

Though at one point

selfishly mourning his aurt's misunderstanding of him, Tom,
Twain noted,

"VMS

sufficiently touched by his aunt's grief to

long to rush ou' from 1:rder the bed ghere he was Milne and
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overwhelm her with joy" (p. 156) and when Aunt Polly lovingly
prayed for Tom "he was weltering in tears again long before
she was through (p. 157)."
The second and more important way that conscience
functions in Tom Sawyer is in the prodding of the sense of
honesty and justice, mingled with personal concern and responsibility, that moves Tom to testify against Injun Joe and in
behalf of Muff Potter.

When Muff, Injun Joe, and the young

Dr. Robinson were in the process of robbing a grave one night,
a fight broke out and the Doctor was killed by Injun Joe who
told whiskey- and blow-befuddled Muff that, in a semi-conscious
stupor, Muff himself had murdered the doctor.
witnesses to the entire sordid

Huck and Tom,

scene, ran from the cemetery in

fear for their lives and signed an oath, in their own blood,
that they would never divulge what they had seen in the moonlit
graveyard.

Twain notes that "Tom's fearful secret and gnawing

conscience disturbed his sleep for as much as a week after
this" (p. 121) and the naturally curious Tom avoided inquests on
dead cats held by his companions in imitation of the adult murder
inquest until "even inquests went out of vogue at last, and
ceased to torture Tom's conscience" (p. 124).

Tom's frequent

trips to Muff's place of imprisonment to smuggle him small gifts
"greatly helped to ease gmphasis mine7 Tom's conscience" (p. 124)
hut did not erase the gnawing knowledge that he must not let an
innocent man hang.
As Muff's trial approached and began, *every reference
to the murder sent a shudder" (p. 216) through Tom's tortured

14
conscience, and he sought out Huck Finn to discuss the secrecy
they had sworn, and the near-certain fate of Muff if they
remained silent.

At the conclusion of their talk in which they

enumerated Muff's numerous small kindnesses to them, the boys
went to see Potter.

Twain noted:

His gratitude for their gifts had always smote their
consciences before--it cut deeper than ever, this time.
They felt cowardly and treacherous to the last degree.
(p. 219)
As Tom's relentless conscience battered him by day and
night, he became more and more miserable and finally "Tom's
harrassed conscience . . . managed to drive him to the lawyer's
house by night and wring a dread tale from lips that had been
sealed with the dismalest and most formidable of ogths" (p. 226).
By night Tom was terrified that Injun Joe (who had escaped the
courtroom at the grisly height of Tom's incriminating testimony)
would return and murder him, but by day he basked in the glow of
being the town's hero and Muff's deliverer.
In Tom Sawyer, Twain abandoned his wishful, quasiserious notion of "The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival of
Crime in Connecticut" that persecuting conscience could be
murdered and obliterated, and moved to the more realistic
position where personal conscience prompted Tom's remorse in his
dealings with Becky. Amy, his thefts, and his Aunt Polly, and
where social and personal conscience drove Tom to explain the
true circumstances surrounding the murder of Dr. Robinson.
Charles Neider notes that "Tom, for all his truancy and lies
and pranks, belongs to the Village, and his conscience Is a

15
sound,

Village conscience."16

This compelling drive

to do the correct thing, as taught by a person's society, and
thereby to placate one's conscience is also manifested in The
Prince and the Pauper (1881).
The Prince and the Pauper is Twain's marvelous
"children's" classic that reveals again his interest in
duality and "cleavage."

In this tale two boys, strikingly

similar in physical appearance, exchange clothes and, in a
development they did not anticipate, temporarily are forced
also to exchange identities.

What may at first appear as a

youthful prank of mistaken identity involves life-changing
complexities for Twain's characters because the principals
involved in the switched identities are Tom Canty, pauper
resident of Offal Court and Edward Tudor, Prince of Wales and
heir to the throne of England.
Tom became "Prince" after the true royal lad stormed
out of the palace to berate a gruff guard for his 111-treatment
of the beggar-boy.

Forgetting his playful change cf clothing

with the boy who so closely paralleled his royal features,
the rightful Prince was abused by the guard he went to reprove
and ejected from the palace gates.

Tom Canty, dressed in the

true prince's regal apparel, was pronounced "mad"17 when he
denied his royal identity, and was gently but firmly subjected
16
Charles Neider, Mark Twain (New York: Horizon Press,
1967). p. 18.
17Mark Twain, The Prince and the Pauper. Author's
National
Edition, vol. 15 (New York: Harper ic Prothers Publishers, 1909;
reprint ed., Grosse Pointe. Mich.: Scholarly Press, n.d.), p. 44.
All future citations to The Prince and the Pauper are from this
volume and are referenced only in the text.

16
to

a ceaseless effort to "remind" him of what he had forgotten

and "restore" his mind gripped by the malady of what was
thought to be insanity, but what was in reality, truth.
Though the true Prince felt pangs of compassion and
conscience when he beheld the plight his country's laws imposed
on the poor and "criminal" populace, and later took steps to
correct injustices he had observed and experienced personally,
Twain's major concern with conscience in The Prince and the
Pauper centered upon Tom Canty and his mock position as prince
and king.

Though Tom had, to a large degree, successfully

abandoned conscience at the time of his assumed royalty, an
encounter with reality "smote him to the heart" (p. 273).

As

the coronation procession for the new king moved through great
throngs:
The mock king's cheeks were flushed with excitement,
his eyes were flashing, his senses swam in a delirium of
pleasure. At this point, just as he was raising his hand
to fling another rich largess, he caught sight of a pale,
astounded face which was strained forward out of the
second rank of the crowd, its intense eyes riveted upon
him. A sickening consternation struck through him; he
recognized his mother: and up flew his hand, palm outward
before his eyes--that old involuntary gesture, born of a
forgotten episode, and perpetuated by habit. In an
instant more she had torn her way out of the press, and
past the guards, and was at his side. She embraced his
leg, she covered it with kisses, she cried, "0, my child,
my darling:" lifting toward him a face that was transfigured with joy and love. The same instant an officer of
the King's Guard snatched her away with a vigorous impulse
from his strong arm. The words "I do not know you, woman:"
were falling from Tom Canty's lips when this piteous thing
occurred; but it smote him to the heart to see her treated
so; and as she turned for a last glimpse of him, whilst
the crowd was swallowing her from his sight, she seemed so
wounded, so broken-hearted, that a shame fell upon him
which consumed his pride to ashes, and withered his stolen
royalty. His arRndeurs were strlken valueless; they
seemed to fall away from him like rotten rags.
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The procession moved on, and still on, through everaugmenting splendors and ever-augmenting tempests of
welcome; but to Tom Canty they were as if they had not
been. He neither saw nor heard. Royalty had lost its
grace and sweetness; its pomps were become a reproach.
Remorse was eating his heart out. He said, "Would God I
were free of my captivity!"
..
"Long live Edward of England!" It seemed as if the
earth shook with the explosion; but there was no response
from the king. He heard it only as one hears the thunder
of the surf when it is blown to the ear out of a great
distance, for it was smothered under another sound which
was still nearer, in his own breast, in his accusing
conscience --a voice which kept repeating those shameful
words, "I do not know you, woman!"
The words smote upon the king's soul as the strokes
of a funeral bell smite upon the soul of a surviving
friend when they remind him of secret treacheries suffered
at his hands by him that is gone.
New glories were unfolded at every turning; new wonders,
new marvels, sprung into view; the pent clamors of waiting
batteries were released; new raptures poured from the
throats of the waiting multitudes; but the king gave no
sign, and the accusing voice that went moaning through his
comfortless breast was all the sound he heard. (pp. 273-75)
After the soul-rending encounter with his mother, the
Pauper-Prince was conducted to the Abbey where coronation
ceremonies were performed and where "Tom Canty grew pale, and
still paler, and a deep and steadily deepening woe and despondency
settled down upon his spirits and upon his remorseful heart"
(p. 2Pl).

Though Tom immediately was striker by guilt as he

denied his mother, vet his situation demanded the remark because
acknowledgement of the woman would have meant reimposition of
his "demented" status, and further possible harm for
who had already been treated roughly by a guard.

s mother

At the point

where the Archbishop of Canterbury held the crown above his
head, just as It appeared that Tom Canty of Offal Court would
become king and circumstances would overpower his consciencestricken heart, the true Prince appeared, and Tom gratefully
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acknowledged him as liege and rightful monarch.

It is impor-

tant to note that here in The Prince and the Pauper circumstances
over which Tom had no control threatened to torment his conscience
yet still determine his fate.

In the passage already cited,

this point is vividly illustrated: it is stated that "remorse
was eating his /Tom's7 heart out" while he pleaded to be freed
from the "captivity" of circumstances he was tormented by and yet
was helpless to control since his position was one of "compulsory
greatness" (p. 274).

In the Abbey, as determined actions seemed

about to triumph while inflicting agony upon the boy helpless to
alter them, Twain suddenly halted the machine-like activities
and allowed Tom's honest identification of the apparent pauper as
true king to triumph over the controlling circumstances.
In The Prince and the Pauper, Twain's developing thought
on man's position as governed by environmental, hereditary, and
social forces while remaining a possessor of conscience (or
sensibility to right and wrong) Is displayed in a fashion similar to the outlook of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer: conscience
is quieted by a person's compliance with its proddings, not by
the unrealistic assassination cf moral values that the narrator
accomplished in "The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival of
Crime in Connecticut."

The Prince and the Pauper marks the con-

elusion of the phase of Twain's thinking where he moved from the
embryonic stage of "The Facts" where plaguing conscience is
simply removed, toward the more realistic response to conscience
as exemplified In Tom Sawyer and The Prince and the Pauper.
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This first section of Twain's thinking deals primarily
with conscience, or man's sense of what Is right and wrong and
his ability to act in the conventional bounds of "good" behavior, rather than dealing principally with man's position as
a controlled or determined being.

Of course, the deterministic

concern was present since Tom Canty and Tom Sawyer acted to
reveal their respective truths because they felt they must
obey the impulses of their environment and heredity, but the
determinism of this period of Twain's thinking was controlled,
submerged, and even subordinated to his interest in man, who
at this point Twain saw as able to act "morally" according to
the dictates of his conscience and in harmony with the accepted
morality of his environment.
With the advent of Adventures of Huckleberry Finn in
1H34, a new emphasis in Twain's thinking emerged.

Tom Sawyer

and Tom Canty obeyed the social moral standard that, in their
cases, produced correct act'ons.

Huck, however, found that

socially "correct" behavior may run counter to a higher form of
personal, internal morality.

Prodded to act in accordance with

his socially conditioned conscience, Huck rejected society's
code of right and wrong that often reflected only local prejudice, not necessarily what was right.

Also In this second

major area of Twain's thought, the determinism that was submerged In his preceding works surfaced in more pronounced form.
It Is toward an exploration of this second step In Twain's
thought on man's control and conscience that attention is now
directed.

CHAPTER II

TRIUMPH OF A SOUND HEART

Considering the impact of Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn (1884), Leo P. levy observes that: "Conscience indeed
makes cowards of us all--except that, rarely it also creates
heroes of the stature of Huckleberry Finn."18

The heroic

nature of Huck Finn is indicative of Twain's second major stage
of thinking on man's conscience and mechanistic control.

During

this second period, Twain acknowledged the control determinism
exercises over man, yet he still Insisted on the presence of
some internal sense of right and wrong beyond the boundaries of
man's conscience, which Twain had come to see, by this time, as
the product of one's environment and training--a form of environmental determinism.
Perhaps the key word in understanding Huckleberry Finn
is conflict in the realm of man's conscience.
notes a "contrast .

Edgar M. Eranch

. between spontaneous human feeling and

the inhumanity of conventional or violent action"19 in the novel.
Coleman O. Parsons states that Huck "is the protesting battleground on which conscience, custom, and law (the Moral Sense
18
Leo P. levy, "Society and Conscience in Huckleberry
Finn," Nineteenth Century Fiction 18 (March 1964): 391.
19
Edgar M. Pranch, "The Two Frovidences: Thematic Form
in 'Huckleberry Finn'," College English 11 (January 1950): 190.
20
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in different aspects) claFh with primal sympathy, the impulsive
will to freedom, /71.-nd7 .
defeat."2°

. the Moral Sense goes down in

Delancey Ferguson calls Huckleberry Finn the "story

of a healthy boy's dealings with his conscience."21

Twain him-

self referred to Huckleberry Finn as "a book of mine where a
sound heart & a deformed conscience come into collision &
conscience suffers a defeat."22
Milton Rickels notes that Twain's conscience was "complex"
and "central to his work."23

Perhaps the complexity of Twain's

conscience is best exemplified in Huckleberry Finn for in Huck
Finn's experience there is the dual compulsion to do the
socially acceptable thing that conscience desires (as did Tom
Sawyer and Tom Canty), at the same time that an inner code cries
for action contrary to the duty demarded by the social conscience.
During this second period of his thinking concerning conscience
and control, Twain saw conscience as equivalent to determinism
because here, as Levy notes, "synonymous with society is conscience as Twain conceives it, the 'unerring monitor' that at
once educates the individual and enslaves him."24

As opposed to

the socially engrained conscience that Is the product of

20Parsons, "The Devil and Samuel Clemens," p. 591.
21 Delancey Ferguson, Mark Twain:
Russell & Russell, 1965), p. 229.

an and Legend (New York:

22Notebook #28a I. Ts,
P. 15. cited by Leo E. Levy,
"Society and Conscience in Huckleberry Finn," Nineteenth
Century Fiction 18 (March 1964): 383.
"Rickels, p. 561.
24- Levy. p. 383.
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environment and training and that is not always reliable as a
guide to correct action, Huck responds to a deeper commitment
to a sense of right and wrong.

Huck's response cannot be

termed the activity of "conscience" or use of the "moral sense"
since Huck's deportment runs counter to what society has
taught is good or moral behavior.

Twain referred to Huck's

actions as the response of a "sound heart."25

Branch observes

that the complexity and conflict of Huckleberry Finn center on
"Huck's serious struggle to follow the promptings of his heart
despite internal and external checks."26
From the action early in the book, J. R. Boggan notes
that "Huck admittedly has a'struggle with his conscience
(between what he feels in his heart toward Jim and what he
thinks, according to society, he ought to feel toward him)."27
The distinction between Huck's feelings and actions as opposed
to his social sense of right and wrong is illustrated in the
dialogue between Huck and Jim immediately after Muck's discovery of Jim on Jackson's Island.

Jim has confessed to Huck

that he is a runaway:
"Jim:"
"But mind, you said you wouldn't tell--you know you
said you wouldn't tell, Huck."
"Well, I did. I said I wouldn't, and I'll stick to
it. Honest injun, I will. People would call me a lowdown Abolitionist and despise me for keeping mum--but
25Ibid.
26
Branch, p. 194.
27J. R. Boggan, "That Slap, Huck, Did It Hurt?," English
Language Notes 1 (March 1964): 212.
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that don't make no difference. I ain't a-going to tell,
and I ain't* .m-gyinm back there, anyways. So, now, leis
know 411 about it."2b
Hannah Arendt's statement that Huck "knows how he feels
about Jim, but he also knows what he is expected to do about
Jim"29 is illustrated in the two places where Huck protected
Jim prior to his final decision in chapter thirty-one to be
eternally condemned rather than betray the slave.

Minor em-

phasis was placed, at the time, on Muck's guilt concerning his
warning Jim of the men approaching Jackson's Island in search
of the runaway.

However, by the time Huck had to decide

whether to report Jim to the slave hunters in the skiff, the
boy was striken with remorse over his neglect of obedience to
conscience.

Jim had just been rejoicing over the fact that he

was nearly free when Huck observed:
Well, I can tell you it made me all over trembly and
feverish, too, to hear him, because I begun to get it
through my head that he was most free--and who was to
blame for it? Why, me. I couldn't get that out of my
conscience, no how nor no way. It got to troubling me
so I couldn't rest, I couldn't stay still in one place.
It hadn't ever come home to me before, what this thing was
that I was doing. But now it did; and it stayed with me,
and scorched me more and more. I tried to make out to
myself that I warn't to blame, because I didn't run Jim
off from his rightful owner; but it warn't no use, conscience up and says, every time, "But you knowed he was
running for his freedom, and you could 'a' paddled ashore
and told somebody." That was so--I couldn't get around
that no way. • • •
28
Mark Twain,
[
-The 7 Adventures of Huckleberry Finn,
Author's National Edition, vol 13 (New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1899; reprint ed., Grosse Pointe, Mich.: Scholarly
Press, n.d.). Pp. 68-69. All future citations to Huckleberry
Finn are from this volume and are referenced only in the text.
29Between Past and Future, p. 157, cited by Neil Schmitz,
"The Paradox of Liberation in Huckleberry Finn," Texas Studies
in Literature and Language 13: 126.
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I got to feeling so mean and so miserable I most
wished I was dead. I fidgeted up and down the raft,
abusing myself to myself, and Jim was fidgeting up and
down past me. We neither of us could keep still.
Every time he danced around and says, "Dah's Cairo:"
it went through me like a shot, and I thought if it
was Cairo I reckoned I would die of miserableness
. . . My conscience got to stirring me up hotter
than ever, until at last I says to it. "Let up on me—
it ain't too late yet--I'll paddle ashore at the first
light and tell." I felt easy and happy and light as a
feather right off. All my troubles was gone. I went
to looking out sharp for a light, and sort of singing
to myself. By and by one showed. (pp. 125-26)
Though Huck had decided to report Jim at the first
opportunity, he found his resolve crippled when he realized
the extent of Jim's trust in him.
/71m7 . . . jumped and got the canoe ready, and put
his old coat in the bottom for me to set on, and give me
the paddle; and as I shoved off, he says:
"Pooty soon I'll be a-shout'n' for joy, en I'll say,
it's all on accounts o' Huck; I's a free man, en I
couldn't ever been free ef it hadn't ben for Huck; Huck
done it. Jim won't ever forwit you, Huck; you's de tes'
fren' Jim's ever had; en you's de only fren' ole Jim's
got now."
I was paddling off, all in a sweat to tell on him;
but when he says this, it seemed to kind of take the tuck
all out of me. I went along slow then, and I warn't right
down certain whether I was glad I started or whether I
warn't. When I was fifty yards off, Jim says:
"Dah you goes, de ole true Huck; de on'y white genlman
dat ever kep' his promise to ole Jim."
Well, I just felt sick. But I says, I got to do it-get out of it. (p. 127)
can't
I
Though Huck told himself he must report Jim, when the opportunity presented itself, he protected Jim by inventing the
story of a raft bearing smallpox victims.

As the slave hunters

departed, th( conflict between what Huck had been taught was
right (his social conscience) flared against what he intuitively
knew to be right (his sound heart).

Henry Nash Smith observes

that "Huck's conscience is simply the attitudes he has taken
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over from his environment.

What is still sound in him is an

impulse from the deepest level of his personality that struggles
against the overlay of prejudice and false valuation imposed on
all members of the society in the name of religion, morality,
30
law, and refinement."
Huck recounted his experience with the slave-hunters
and his struagle with himself in the following manner:
They went off and I got aboard the raft, feeling bad
and low, because I knowed very well I had done wrong, and
I see it warn't no use for me to try to learn to do right;
a body that don't get started right when he's little ain't
got no show--when the pinch comes there ain't nothing to
back him up and keep him to his work, and so he gets beat.
Then I s'pose you'd 'a' done right and give Jim up, would
you felt better than what you do now?
No, says I, I'd feel
bad --I'd feel just the Same way I do now. Well, then,
says I, what's the use you learning to do right when it's
troublesome to do right and ain't no trouble to do wrong,
and the wages is just the same? I was stuck. I couldn't
answer that. So I reckoned I wouldn't bother no more about
It, but after this always do whichever come handiest at the
time. (pp. 129-30)
In interpreting this key passage from Huckleberry Finn, Neil
Schmitz underscores the fact that "Huck is harassed from all
sides, within and without.

He not only defies his social con-

science in shielding Jim from capture, but also, to a large
extent, his own inner needs."31

Huck blamed his inability to

turn in Jim upon the upbringing that shaped his social conscience.
Though Huck wanted to "learn to do right" (pp. 129-30) he noted
that "a body that don't get started right when he's little
30Henry Nash
Smith, Mark Twain: The Development of a
Writer (New York: Atheneum, 1972), p. 123.
31 Nell Schmitz, "The Paradox of Liberation in huckleberry
Finn." Texas Studies In Literaturc and Languaste 13: 114.
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ain't got no show-- . . . so he gets beat" (p. 130).

Huck's

lqck of proper childhood traininw, therefore, determined his
failure in "the pinch" (p. 130) of moral decision.

Yet, Huck

was aware that he "had done wrong" (p. 130) in the eyes of
society.

Here Huck confronted and acknowledged his double

predicament--he was void of proper training while young, and
thereby was not able to fall back on his pre'rious instruction
to prevent his error in not reporting Jim; yet, he was also
aware of the violation of his "conventional conscience"32 that
pressed him for the correct action--that of reporting Jim as a
runaway slave.

Roth internally, through his desire not to be

wicked, and externally, through the expectations of society
engrained in the boy, Huck was besieged by opposition to his
sound heart.
Huck's struggle with social conscience--the product of
environment and training --against the feelings of his deeper
commitment to right and wrong as reflected in his sound heart
centers principally on Jim.

Neil Schmitz describes Jim as "the

dark tutor who helps unlock the 'sound heart' imprisoned in
Huck's breast."33

This struggle introduced In the episode

involving the Negro-hunters culminates in the climactic "You
Can't Pray a Lie" chapter.

However, before the finale of the

combat between conventional or social conscience against Huck's
inner moral rode, three incidents occur that test Huck's sound
heart ard prepare the reader for Huck's ultimate resolution of

32Pranch. p. 188.

33Schmitz, p. 127.
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the conflict.

Muck's sound heart triumphed in relation to his

refusal to abandon the marooned murderers, his remorse for
fooling Jim, and his prevention of the robbing of the Wilks
sisters.
One test of Muck's sound heart occurred when Huck and
Jim boarded the wrecked steamboat "Walter Scott" and found
three criminals inside a lighted cabin room.

Two of the mur-

derous thieves were arguing over the fate of their partner who
was bound hand and foot upon the floor.

When their raft broke

its mooring and drifted away in the current, Huck and Jim took
the outlaws' boat and left the men, without any means of escape,
upon the vessel that was motentarily to break apart and float
away.

When Huck and Jim were in pursuit of their raft, Huck

began to worry about the thieves: "I begun to think how dreadful
it was, even for murderers, to be in such a fix" (p. 104).
Huch's sound heart troubled him so intensely that he invented
a story to incite the watchman on a ferryboat to go to the
wreck, thus providing the outlaws with a means of escape from
the sinking boat.

While reflecting on his action to save the

murderers, Muck said: "I was feeling ruther comfortable on accounts of taking all this trouble for that gang, for not many
would 'a' done it" (p. 10).

Though Huck remarked that the

Widow would have been proud of him for his efforts and thus his
action would have been in accord with social conscience, primarily
Muck's action was the result of his inner feeling or sound heart.
The men he made an effort to save were guilty of transgressing
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the conventional code of right and wrong, and Huck notes that
few people would have felt compelled, as he did by his heart,
to have aided the criminals.
The second instance of the triumph of Huck's sound
heart occurred at the time when Huck convinced Jim that the
nightmare of their separation in a dense fog was merely the
result of Jim's superstitious dreaming.

When Jim saw the

leaves and refuse that betrayed the reality of his "dream"
and the falsity of Huck's description of what had happened.
Jim strongly denounced Huck's mischievous foolery.

Jim simply

but sternly rebuked Huck for his lie.
Then he got up slow and walked to the wigwam, and went
in there without saying anything but that. But that was
enough. It made me feel so mean I could almost kissed
his foot to get him to take it back.
It was fifteen minutes before I could work myself up
to go and humble myself to a nigger; but I done it, and
I warn't ever sorry for it afterward, neither. I didn't
do him no more mean tricks, and I wouldn't done that one
if I'd °a' knowed it would make him feel that way.
(pp. 122-23)
Huck's inner sensitivity to right and wrong prompted him
to apologize to the Negro that society viewed as an inferior
being whose feelings were of no significance.

Huck obeyed the

promptings of his heart rather than the impulse of his social
conscience in relationship to Jim.
Finally, the third instance reflecting the influence of
Huck's heart on his actions occurred at the Wilks sisters' home.
Huck and Jim had been joined on the raft by the king and the
duke, two small time confidence men adept at defrauding towns
along the river.

Fternard DeVoto called them "two rogues • • •
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formed from the nation's scum."34

The frauds' most lucrative

opportunity was their planned swindle of the bereaved Wilks
family.

The "royal" pair intended to steal dead Peter Wilks'

gold from his daughters by impersonating Harvey and William
Wilks, the dead man's English brothers.

Huck was immediately

disgusted with the imposters as they masquaraded as Rev. Harvey
Wilks and his deaf and dumb brother, William.

Huck noted that

their actions were "enough to make a body ashamed of the human
race" (p. 216).

Huck's reaction to the king and duke's robbery

of the innocent girls soon moved from disgust to remorse.

He

decided to help the three girls: "I felt so ornery and low down
and mean that I says to myself, my mind's made up;
that money for them or bust" (p. 231).

five

Huck's endangerment of

himself as he did successfully retrieve the girls' money illustrates again the existence of the sound heart that emerges fully
developl:Id in the chapter "You Can't Pray a Lie."
The full impact of the battle between his social conscience
and his inner moral gauge struck Huck when the king and duke
sold Jim into slavery for forty dollars.

Huck realized his

decision not to report Jim opposed his social conscience and
carried an awful stigma with it.
It would get all around that Huck Finn helped a nigger to
wet his freedom; and if I was ever to see anybody from
that town again I'd be ready to get down and lick his boots
for shame. That's just the way; a person does a low-down
thing, and then he don't want to take no consequences of it.
Thinks as lona as he can hide it ain't no disgrace. That
was my fix exactly. The more I studied about this the more
my conscience went to grinding me, and the more low-down and

34Bernard DeVoto, Mark Twain's America (Cambridge:
Riverside Press. 1932), p. 319.
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ornery I got to feeling. And at last, when it hit me all
of a sudden that here was the plain hand of Providence
slapping me in the face and letting me know my wickedness
was being watched all the time from up there in heaven,
whilst I was stealing a poor old woman's nigger that
hadn't ever done me no harm, and now Was showing me there's
One that's always on the lookout, and ain't a-going to
allow no such miserable doings to go only just so fur and
no further, I most dropped in my tracks I was so scared.
Will, I tried the best I could to kinder soften it up
somehow for myself by saying I was brung up wicked, and so
I warn't so much to blame; but something inside of me kept
saying, "There was the Sunday-school, you could 'a' gone
to it; and if you'd 'a' done it they'd 'a' learnt you there
that people that acts as I'd been acting about that nigger
goes to everlasting fire." (p. 277)
An interesting exchange occurred in the above passage as
Huck offered the excuse of his upbringing as a justification for
his actions while something within reminded him of his neglect
of Sunday School instruction.

Huck offered the wickedness of

his past as the shaping influence that regulated his conduct and,
because of his past's control over him, absolved rum of responsibility for his action.

Something else within him, the standard

of social conscience, insisted that his poor background and
evil life could have been neutralized and overpowered by his
attendance of Sunday School.

At any rate, Huck was caught

again on twin horns of a deterministic dilemma: he was doomed to
failure both because of his training at home And his lack of
spiritual guidance.

Soon however, Huck was to reject the de-

terminism of social conscience as well as his lack of home
training in favor of the influence of his inner feelinas, or his
sound heart.
The torment of social conscience caused Huck to write
brief note to Miss Watson informing her of her runaway slave's
location.

As he obeyed the direction of his societal sense of
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right and wrong by deciding to report Jim, Huck was elated
that he had overcome both the determined evil of his background and the lack of socially expected religious training,
and had done what social conscience and "Sunday School standards"
told him.

The exuberance was momentary, however, for soon

Huck's sound heart was in rebellion against the "correct"
decision of his social conscience.
I felt good and all washed clean of sin for the first
time I had ever felt so In my life, and I knowed I could
pray now. But I didn't do it straight off, but laid the
paper down and set there thinking—thinking how good it
was all this happened so, and how near I come to being
lost and going to hell. And went on thinking. And got to
thinking over our trip down the river; and I see Jim before
me all the time: in the day and in the night-time, sometimes moonlight, sometites storms, and we a-floating along,
talking and singing and laughing. Put somehow I couldn't
seem to strike no places to harden me against him, but
only the other kind. I'd see him standing my watch on top
of his'n, 'stead of calling me, so I could go on sleeping:
ard see him how glad he was when I come back out of the fog;
and when I come to him again In the swamp, up there where
the feud was: and such-like times; and would always call me
honey, and pet me, and do everything he could think of for
me, and how good he always was: and at last I struck the
time I saved him by telling the men we had smallpox aboard,
and he was so grateful, and said I was the best friend old
Jim ever nad in the world, and the only one he's got now;
and then I happened to look around and see that paper.
(pp. 278-79)
Huck's decision to "go to hell" (p. 279) rather than
report Jim has been termed his renunciation of "the commercial
morality of the South"35 and the ultimate victory of "moral
Intuition" over the "conventional code."36

Levy notes: "Huck,

after heroic struggles with the internalized form of society.

35"The Rear' and Huckleberry Finn: Heroic Quests for Moral
Liberation," Mark Twain Journal 12 (Spring 1963): 12.
36
Branch, p. 189.
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his conscience, flowers as the perfectly natural being whose
decency and humanity guide him through the circles of hell
that make up the evils and terrors of organized society."37
Huck described his point of decision in vivid detail:
It was a close place. I took it up, and held it in
my hand. I was a-trembling, because I'd got to decide,
forever, betwixt two things, and I knowed it. I studied
a minute, sort of holding my breath, and then says to
myself:
"All right, then, I'll a2 to hell"--and tore it up.
(p. 279)
Lionel Trilling notes that here "Huck discards the moral
code he has always taken for granted and resolves to help Jim
in his escape from slavery.„ 38

R. P. Adams com-nends Huck's

choice by saying: "If It is'fine to follow as Thoreau does the
dictates of conscience over law, it is finer and much more
difficult to follow those of the right over conscience and law
combined."39

Huck's victory was over the unreliable social

conscience whose "right” action really was opposed to natural
goodness and the sound

heart.

levy notes: "The triumph of

decency Is the shedding of conventional morality; immorality,
paradoxically, is the source of v1rtue."4°
After Huck's decision in favor of his sound heart, he
decided to pursue wickedness wholesale from that point in his

37Levy.

p. 388.

38Lionel Trilling, Introduction to Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, by Mark
an (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers,
n.1.: New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1948), p. xi.
39"The Unity and Coherence of Huckleberry Finn," cited by
Leo P. Levy, "Society and Conscience in Huckleberry Finn,"
Nineteenth Century Fiction 18: 189.
40Levy, p. 18R.
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life forward:
It was awful thoughts and awful words, but they was
said. And I let them stay said; and never thought no
more about reforming. I shoved the whole thing out of
my head, and said I would take up wickedness again, which
was In my line, being brung up to it, and the other
warn't. And for a starter I would go to work and steal
Jim out of slavery again; and if I could think up anything worse, I would do that, too; because as long as I
was in, and in for good. I might as well go the whole
hog. (p. 279)
Huck's commitment to engage in "whole hog" wickedness reflects
the sentiments and sense of release the narrator achieved in
"The Facts Concerning the Recent Carnival of Crime in ConnecIn "The Facts" the narrator was freed from remorse and

ticut."

restraint after he killed and burned his impish Conscience.

He

was then able to indulge in activities that previously his
Conscience would have tormented him about and kept him from
doing.

Similarly nere in Huckleberry Finn, Huck declared his

intention to shun reform and engaze entirely in devious activities since he had chosen what In his sound heart was right, yet
what his socially determined conscience pronounced wicked and
damnable.

However, Huck's decision to abandon conscience was

completely different from that of the narrator of "The Facts."
The narrator's actions in Twain's earlier short story were the
result of Twain's unrealistic wish that conscience could be
destroyed.

Huck, though able to cast aside the trappings of

conventional conscience, was not able to dismiss his sound heart.
Soon the reader knows that despite Huck's avowed life of
wickedness, the boy will be unable to live in the remorseless
world of the narrator in "The Facts."

Illustration of the

abiding presence of Huck's sound heart occurred when the king

and duke were caught in their fraudulent "Royal Nonesuch"
performance and were tarred and feathered.

Smitten with the

scene before him, Huck said:
Well, it made me sick to see it; and I was sorry for them
poor pitiful rascals, it seemed like I couldn't ever feel
any hardness against them any more in the world. It was
a dreadful thing to see. Human beings can be awful cruel
to one another. . . .
So we poked along back home, and I warn't feeling so
brash as I was before, but kind of ornery, and humble,
and to blame, somehow--though I hadn't done nothing. But
that's always the way; it don't make no difference whether
you do right or wrong, a person's conscience ain't got no
sense, and just goes for him anyway. If I had a yaller
dog that didn't know no more than a person's conscience
does I would pison him. It takes up more room than all the
rest of a person's insides, and yet ain't no good, nohow.
(pp. 299-300)
Huck's opinion on conscience is echoed in the narrative
related by Hank Morgan, the nineteenth century Yankee transplanted into Arthurian England in A Connecticut Yankee in King
Arthur's Court (1889).

While discoursing on conscience,

Hank observed:
If I had the remaking of man, he wouldn't have any
conscience. It is one of the most disagreeable things
connected with a person; and although it certainly does a
great deal of good, it cannot be said to pay in the long
run; it would be much better to have less good and more
comfort. Still, this is only my opinion, and I am only
one man; others, with less experience, may think differently. They have a right to their view. I only stand to
this: I have noticed my conscience for many years, and I
know it is more trouble and bother to me than anything else
I started with. I suppose that in the beginning I prized
it, because we prize anything that is ours; and yet how
foolish it WRS to think so. If we look at it in another
way, we see how absurd it is: if I had an anvil in me would
I prize it? Of course not. And yet when you come to
think, there is no real difference between a conscience
and an anvil--I mean for comfort. I have noticed it a
thousand times. And you could dissolve an anvil with
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acids, when you couldn't stand it any longer; but there
isn't any way that you can work off a conscience--at
least sp it will stay worked off; not that I know of,
anyway.41
Hank, like Huck Finn, concludes that no matter how unreliable
and burdensome a person's conscience is, there is simply no way
to escape the prompting of a sound heart and permanently "work
it off" as did the narrator in "The Facts" in Twain's early,
wistful tale about conscience.
By 1890, Mark Twain had grappled with his preliminary
thinking on conscience as exemplified in "The Facts," Tom
Sawyer, and The Prince and the Pauper.

Also, he had recognized

and explored the distinction central to Huckleberry Finn: the
socially engrained conscience in opposition to man's sound heart.
In 1894 the transitional work, Pudd'nhead Wilson ushered in the
third and final period of Twain's thinking on man's control and
conscience.

From the bridge of ideas that Pudd'nhead Wilson

provided, Twain culminated his thinking on man as a creature of
conscience, yet one controlled by mechanistic determinism.

In

his late writing Twain removed man's few remaining intuitive
controls over his life by placing him in a wholly mechanistic
world where he still was subject to guilt, but was powerless to
rise above it because of circumstances beyond his control.

Such

was the thinking of Pudd'nhead Wilson, "The Man That Corrupted
Hadleyburg," "The Damned Human Race," "What is Man?" "The Mysterious Stranger," and "Letters from the Earth" that will be
considered in the concluding chapter.
41Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee In King Arthur's Court,
Author's National Edition, vol. 16 (New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1899: reprint ed., Grosse Pointe, Mich.: Scholarly
Press, n.d.). p. 146.

CHAPTER III

MAN: VAGRANT, USELESS, HOMELESS AMONG THE EMPTY ETERNITIES

The concluding phase in the development of Twain's
thinking on the relationship between man's conscience and his
lack of control in a mechanistic world is bleak and complex.
It is during this period that Twain spoke so caustically of
the "damned human race" of which he was a member.

As he

vehemently condemned man, he also insisted on the complete
determinism of man's life and actions.

Paradoxically, while

he condemned man, Twain also pleaded for man's release from
responsibility for his actions since life is determined by
exterior forces, and man is no more or less than the sum total
of the influences brought to bear upon him through heredity and
environment.

In the midst of this convolution of thought Twain

added another element: conscience or the moral serse.

In

addition to expanding man's determinism and calling for man's
absolution from responsibility. Twain also discussed the guilt
that conscience inflicts upon man, despite his inability to
either rise atove his guilt or alter his determined course of
life and action.

Fudd'nhead Wilson (1894) spans the gap be-

tween Twain's Idea of the possitle victory of a sound heart
over determinism and the culmination of his thinking on
mechanism and moral responsibility detailed in the late Twain
writings.

Important as a transitional piece between Twain's

?f,
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second and third major stages of thinking on man's conscience
in a deterministic world, Pudd'nhead Wilson provides a meaningful framework for discussion of "The Man That Corrupted
Hadleyburg" (1899), "The Damned Human Race" (1905-1909), "What
Is Man?" (1906), "The Mysterious Stranger" (1916), and "Letters
From the Earth" (1962).
Pudd'nhead Wilson is the triple-strand story of David
(Pudd'nhead) Wilson, the laughing stock of Dawson's Landing,
who becomes the town's hero through using finger prints to
solve a murder; Luigi and Angelo, Italian twins who come to the
river town; and Thomas

A

Becket Driscoll (Tom) and Valet de

Chambre (Chambers), master and slave look-alikes who are
switched in their cradles soon after their births, thus exchanging identities.

The dominant theme is that involving the

boys whose identities were changed; the stories of Pudd'nhead
and the twins are intertwined with, but secondary to, the major
plot.

Louis H. Leiter says that both Tom and Chambers are

subject to "enslavement to inherited attitudes, ideas, traditions, self-delusions, and the like, which goes beyond actual
enslavement of the regro."42

Marilyn G. Rose says: "Both boys

are victims of their environment."43

Tom and Chambers are

chained to their surroundings because of the actions of Roxana
(Boxy), a beautiful slave only one-sixteenth black.

When her

42
Louis H. Leiter, "Dawson's Landing: Thematic Cityscape
in Twain's Pudd'nhead Wilson," Mark Twain Journal 13 (Winter
1965-1966): R.
43Marilyn G. Rose, "Pudd'nhead Wilson: a Contemporary
Parable," Mark Twain Journal 13 (Summer 1966): 7.
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master's son and Roxy's own son were only a few months old,
the slave woman switched the nearly identical slave and white
babies so her child could not be sold South--a fate worse
than death to the slaves.

The usurpation was not detected,

and the boys grew up assuming each other's position in the
stratified slave-master society of the town.

Though Tom (the

real slave Chambers) was upon occasion struck with "a sort of
echo in his conscience"44 and, upon learning of his true
identity, said the information on his background would change
his entire life, "the main structure of his character was not
changed, and could not be changed" (p. 92) by the revelation
of his identity.

Wendy A. Bie notes: "Tom Driscoll matures in

one of the most rigidly moral of atmospheres, that of the
Southern Gentleman.

Yet ir spite of his teaching's emphasis

on mercy, kindness, and honor, Tom is thoroughly sadistic and
brings both dishonor and death to his family."45

Tom therefore

was governed by forces of heredity as well as being controlled
by favorable factors in his environment that had temporarily
elevated him from slavery to freedom.

In discussing the effects

of heredity and environment on Tom and Chambers, Robert A.
Wiggins notes:
Mark Twain, Pudd'nhead Wilson and Those Extraordinary
"
Twins, Author's National Edition. vol. 14 (New York: Harper &
FF3TEers Publishers, 1899: reprint ed., Grosse Pointe, Mich.:
Scholarly Press, n.d.), p. 76. All future citations to
Pudd•nhead Wilson are from this volume and are referenced only
In the text.
45Wendy A. Bie, "Mark Twain's Bitter Duality." Mark Twain
Journal 16 (Summer 1972): 15.
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Cne is damned because one thirty-second part of him was
black, though he was raised as white, and the other
damned because he was raised as a black, though all his
ancestry was white. On one hand heredity is the factor
determining character, and on the other it is environment.46
The central concern of Pudd'nhead Wilson is obviously
determinism, but a major question arises concerning the typf,
of determinism that is primary to the work.

Given the nature

of the work itself, one would expect the dominant form of
determinism to be environmental, since the main point Twain
made is the importance of environment in a person's development.
The switched identities of Tom and Chambers were apparently
intended to bear out this very point.

Yet, a complication

occurs because of Twain's introduction of Roxy's comment to Tom
about the effect of his "nigger" blood upon his behavior.
Thirty-one parts o' you is wnite, en on'y one part nigger,
en dat po' little one part is yo' soul. 'Tain't wuth
savin'; tain't wuth totin' out on a shovel en throwin' in
de gutter. (p. 92)
This statement raises a critical question of interpretation.
Did Twain actually expect the reader to accept literally the
validity of Roxy's statement?

Is he satirizing the Southern

delusion that the blood of a particular race Is either privileged or degraded?

Or is Twain deliberately ambiguous in an

effort either to gain wider acceptance among Southern readers
or to stimulate areater discussion of an issue he believed
needed re-examination?
Leslie Fiedler's comments are important in dealing with
this difficult ambiguity concerning Twain and his position

46Robert

A. Wiggins, "Pudd'nhead Wilson: A Literary Caesarean Operation," College English 25 (December 1963):

le3.
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in Pudd'nhead Wilson.

Fiedler says:

Perhaps the supreme achievement of this book is to
have rendered such indignities .
5oxy's statement7 not in
terms of melodrama or as a parochial "social problem"
but as a local instance of some universal guilt and doom.
The false Tom, who is the fruit of all the betrayal and
terror and profaned love which lies between white man
and black, embodies also its "dark necessity"--and must
lie, steal, kill and boast until in his hybris he reveals
himself as the slave we all secretly are.'"
Fiedler's view echoes a passage in Twain's notebook:
"The skin of every human being contains a slave.„4.8

The inborn

characteristic of mankind's guilt, expressed by Twain as the
"slave” in each person, or tne "nigger" in every individual,
is a vital part of Pudd'nhead Wilson.

Tom, therefore, may be

symbolic of the darkness that lurks in every person's composition as a member of the marred human family.
Twain in Ftdd'nhead Wilson is concerned with two aspects
of determinism.

His central assertion on the importance of

one's environment in determining his fate is expressed with less
clarity because Twain was convinced that all men, regardless of
environment are victimized In their being human and thus are
subject to human fallings.

Therefore, while environmental

determinism predominates, the Influence of heredity also presents itself as a very real force that must be reckoned with in
Twain's thinking and works.

Here is the ambiguity of Tom's

position as one environmentally privileged, yet one shackled by
47
Leslie Feldler. "As Free AS Any Cretur . • e,• New
Republic, 22 August 1955, p. 17.
48_
-Leslie Feidler. "As Free AS Any Cretur . • .." New
Republic, 15 August 1955. p. 18.
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the influence of something hereditarily endowed by his membership in the human race.
Tom's marred conscience was a relatively insignificant
factor in his behavior.

Even when he sold his own mother down

the river into slavery because his circumstances appeared to
him to offer no alternative, he was troubled for a very short
period by any type of remorse over his deed.

Twain noted:

"For a whole week he was not able to sleep well, so much the
villainy which he had played upon his trusting mother preyed
upon his rag of a conscience; but after that he began to get comfortable again, and was presently able to sleep like any other
miscreant" (p. 162).
The most activity of Tom's "rag of conscience" was
apparent during the trial of his uncle's "murderers," and one
may well question Tom's depth of a sense of guilt even then in
light of his past callousness to his misdeeds:
He was playing a part, but it was not all a part. The
picture of his alleged uncle, as he had last seen him,
was before him in the dark pretty frequently, when he was
awake, and called again in his dreams, when he was asleep.
(P. 193)
Pudd'nhead Wilson solved not only the puzzle of Judge Driscoll's
murder, but also revealed the switched identities of Tom and
Chambers.

The false "Tom" confessed the murder and his various

crimes and was sold down the river as a slave.

"Chambers," the

real Tom, was elevated to his rightful position, but the influence of environment overcame his "white" heredity and the true
Tom was placed in a terrible situation that he could not
overcome because of the impact and power of his environmental
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training as a slave:
The real heir suddenly found himself rich and free,
but in a most embarrassing situation. he could neither
read nor write, and his speech was the basest dialect of
the Negro quarter. his gait, his attitudes, his gestures,
his bearing, his laugh --all were v'ulgar and uncouth; his
manners were the manners of a slave. Money and fire
clothes could not mend these defects or cover them up;
they only made them the more glaring and the more pathetic.
The poor fellow could not endure the terrors of the white
man's parlor, and felt at home and at peace nowhere but in
the kitchen. The family pew was a misery to him, yet he
could nevermore enter into the solacing refuge of the
"nigger gallery"--that was closed to him for good and all.
(p. 224)
Twain's view in Pudd'nhead Wilson eliminates response of
the sound heart that Huck Finn was able to employ because the
characters in Pudd'nhead Wilson are completely determined by
heredity and environment.

The real slave Chambers' downfall

comes about because of his inborn traits that he could not overcome in spite of every advantage environment could offer; the
real Tom's control by determinism comes because environment
overcomes hereditary rank and privilege.

In both cases,

determinism was responsltle for every facet of the characters'
lives and actions.

As Wiggins notes: "The conclusion of the

book . . . affirms . . . that the individual is not responsible
for his character; he Is the product of forces outside his
control.""

The triumph of ethically based social conscience

and the vic'ory of the sound heart over misguided social standards possible in Twain's earlier writings are abolished in the
wake of absolute determinism during the period Pudd'nhead
Wilson introduces.

"Wiggins, p. 1P,1.
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An interesting parallel may be noted between the
dismissal of conscience in Pudd'nhead Wilson and the annihilation of conscience in "The Facts Concerning the Recent
Carnival of Crime in Connecticut."
obliterated his conscience.

In "The Facts" the narrator

However, Twain soon realized that

destruction of conscience was a fanciful unreality and began,
in Tom Sawyer and subsequent works, to deal realistically with
the presence of conscience.

Once more. however. Twain reverted

to the position of virtual absence of conscience in Pudd'nhead
Wilson.

Again, Twain realized that this was an implausible

situation.

Though by this time Twain accounted man under the

total domination of determinis7, he also realized that, though
he pleaded that man was not responsible for his actions, guilt
produced by some form of moral sensitivity was still very real.
Conscience could not siTply be excised from experience as it
had largely been in Pudd'nhead Wilson.

With "The Man That

Corrupted Hadleburg" Twain was again portraying the presence of
conscience more realistically.

Conscience in "HadleyturR" is

not a force prompting Tositive action like that Twain worked
out in his two previous stages of thinking.

Hather, presence of

conscience produces a sense of guilt and remorse that plague
individuals in spite of their inability to change their activities or dismiss their remorse.
Albert B. Paine described "The Man That Corrupted
Hq "
- leyurg" by saying: "Human weakness and rotten moral force
wcre

never stripped so tare or so mercilessly jeered at in
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the marketplace."50

DeLancey Ferguson agrees that Twain's

story carries universal applications.
Hadleyburg Is just

As

He notes that though

realistically sketched as many of

Twain's other fictitious towns, "It is also a place where the
whole damned race is at home."51

Hadleyburg mirrors not only

the depravity of humanity, but also the reason for the town's
degradation: determinism.

Ferguson says that if the reader is

honest with himself, he will come away from "Hadleyburg"
realizing his envelorment in determined circumstances and admitting: "There, with ()r- without the grace of God, go 1,"52
for the theme of the story. as Henry Nash Smith notes, is human
bondage.53
Hadleyburg, a town renowned for its spotless honesty,
was shaken to its core by the public revelation of eighteen of
its nineteen prominent residents as frauds and attempted thieves.
When an unknown man left a bag of gold to be claimed by the one
who had shown him kindness long ago, the "upright" citizens of
"incorruptible Hadleyburg" were revealed as "in reality the
slaves of their own avariciousness."

54

Clinton Purhans rotes

that Twain's view of conscience in "Hadleyburg" was that of an
environmentally determined morality.

Hadleyburg falls, says

50Albert Bigelow Paine, cited by Van Wyck Brooks,
The Ordeal of Mark Twain (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company,
1933), P. 234.
51Ferguson, p. 279.
52Ibid.
53Smith, p. 183.
54Levy, p. 389.
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Fturhans, because the people's training had consisted of embedding
the "moral ideal of honesty"55 without allowing any type of
test of their teachings' strength, and because "Hadleyburg
forgets that man is determined by heredity as well as by environment, that human nature is potentially petty and selfish as
well as noble and kind."56
Twain focused attention on the Richards, an elderly
couple who lived in Hadleyburg.

Through Edward and Mary Richards,

Twain not only hammered home the determinism of man, but also he
illustrated the presence of conscience in human experience.
Conscience, shaped by the environment of the citizens of
Hadleyhurg, was unable to produce correct behavior, and instead
functioned as a source of an Intense sense of guilt and remorse
for the Richards, though due to their determinism, they were
helpless to act any other way.
AS Smith notes: "Richards calls himself a 'slave' to the
bank president Pinkerton, and all the leading citizens.
including Pinkerton, are enslaved by greed."57

Purhans says

"despite the warnings of his conscience, each is driven by his
desires for wealth, security, and social position to rationalize
and then to lie about his right to the gold."58

Richards'

conscience WAS impotent against the determinism of events that
55Clinton S. Purhans, Jr., "The Sober Affirmation of
Mark Twain's Hadleyburg." American Literature 34 (March 1962January 1963): 378.
56Ibid.. p. 377.
57Smith. p. 183.
58Purhans, p. 380.
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he faced and Twain noted: "Edward fell --that is, he sat still;
sat with a conscience which was not satisfied, bu,
,
- which was
overpowered by circumstances Lemphasis mine7."59
shaped by the community

Was

The conscience

insignificant In the face of

circumstances that controlled Richards' decision not to reveal
his true involvement in dishonesty.

As the town praises the

couple for their honesty and awards them proceeds from the
auction of gold-plated lead coins in the stranger's bag, Smith
says "Richards succumbs again to the more grievous temptation
of being publically acclaimed for his integrity, receives a
fortune together with the praise of the community, and dies
from the pangs of guilt and shame.

It is hard to conceive of a

more tightly mathematical demonstration of human depravity."60
As the depravity of the town is complete, so is the
determinism of events surrounding hadleyburg's fall.

As Richards

and his wife were dying from their remorse and sense of guilt,
they revealed the truth surrounding their actions that they
thought were already known by the town, but ironically were
first exposed by the guilt-striken couple.
Six days passed, then came more news. The old couple
were dying. Richards' mind cleared in his latest hour,
and he sent for Burgess. Purgess said:
"Let the room be cleared. I think he wishes to say
something in privacy."
"No:" said Richards: "I want witnesses. I want you
all to hear my confession, so that I may die a man, and

59Mark Twain, "The Man That Corrupted Hadleyturg." in
The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg and Other Essays and Stories,
Author's National Edition, vol.
3 (New York: Harper & Frothers
Publishers, 1903: reprint ed., Grosse Pointe, Mich.: Scholarly
Press, r.d.). p. 69. All future citations to "Hadleyburp" are
from this volume and arc referenced only In the text.
60Smith, p.
1.
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not a dog. I was clean--artificially--like the rest; and
like the rest I fell when temptation came. I signed a
lie, and claimed the miserable sack. Mr. Burgess remembered
that I had done him a service, and in gratitude (and
ignorance) he suppressed my claim and saved me. You know
the thing that was charged against Burgess years ago. My
testimony, and mine alone, could have cleared him. and I
was a coward, and left him to suffer disgrace--"
"No--no--Mr. Richards, you--"
"My servant betrayed my secret to him--"
"No one has betrayed anything to me--"
"--and then he did a natural and justifiable thing, he
repented of the saving kindness which he had done me, and he
exposed me--as I deserved--"
"Never ---I make oath--"
"Out of my heart I forgive him."
Burgess's impassioned protestations fell upon deaf ears;
the dying man passed away without knowing that once more he
had done poor Burgess a wrong. The old wife died that right.
The last of the sacred Nineteen had fallen a prey to the
fiendish sack; the town was stripped of the last rag of its
ancient glory. (pl. 82-83)
The determinism of circumstances that caused Richards to
lie in the first place, suffer remorse because of what he had
been forced to do, and confess his dishonesty as he died had come
full circle.

The Richards were forced to dishonesty by circum-

stances beyond their control; they were consumed by wrief over
something they were helpless to regulate; they were exposed and
dishonored by cold mechanistic forces that made ludicrous their
suffering and death.
human race."

Hadleytura certainly represents a "damned

The town's downfall came because its citizens

prided themselves on a virtue they, in actuality, did not possess.
Both conscience and determinism play a role In the story, but it
Is determinism that triumphs.

Though the changing of the town's

motto suaaests a possibility of a different mode of conduct for
later citizens, the outlook for Hadleyburg, and the entire human
family, continues to deteriorate in Twain's works.
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If Pudd'nheRd Wilson may be seen as the bridge
connecting Twain's second and third facets of thinking on
conscience and deterministic control, and "The Man That
Corrupted Hadleyturg" may be viewed as the path leading
directly to an abyss, then "The Damned Human Race" is certainly
Twain's plunge into the persuasion and thinking that produced
his final bleak writing.

Van Wyck Prooks notes that Twain's

"withering contempt for humankind . . . was . . . expressed
more and more openly, as time went on."61

Py the years 1905

through 1909, when Twain wrote "The Damned Human Race," his
ideas on the depravity of man's character were fully developed
and devastatingly presented.
Edward Wagenknecht discusses Twain's use of animals as
contrasted to man in this period of late writings by saying:
There is something very touching about Mark Twain's attitude
toward animals at the end of his life: as his pessimism
grew uron him, as he became more and more disgusted with the
damned human race, ne turned to them for comfort. They
delivered him from the domination of the Moral Sense, for,
like the apEels, they never sinned and therefore are sure
of heaven.'"
Twain's statements on man's thievery, greed, revenge, war,
slavery, and cruelty in "The Damned Human Race" certainly make
the animal existence look more desirable than humanity.

Twain's

comment on man's cruelty foreshadows the statements of Satan in
"The Mysterious Stranger" regarding so-called "Inhumane actions"
that are paradoxically characteristic only of man.
Damned Human Pace" Twain said:

61 urooks, p. 239.
62
Wagenknecht, p. 114.

In "The
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Of all the animals, man is the only one that is cruel.
He is the only one that inflicts pain for the pleasure of
doing it. It is a trait that is not known to the higher
animals. The cat plays with the frightened mouse; but
she has this excuse, that she does not know that the mouse
is suffering. The cat is moderate--unhumanly moderate:
she only scares the mouse, she does not hurt it; she
doesn't dig out its eyes, or tear off its skin, or drive
splinters under its nails—man-fashion: when she is done
playing with it she makes a sudden meal of it and puts it
out of its trouble. Man is the Cruel Animal. He is alone
in that distinction.63
Twain also pronounced "man . . . the only Slave" (p. 179).
Frooks says: "Mark Twain's view of man, in short, was quite
rudimentary.

He considered life a mistake and the human animal

the contemptible machine he had found him."64
due to his mechanism, Twain insisted.

Man's slavery was

In the section entitled

"In the Animals' Court" of "The Damned Humar Race," Twain's
trial questioning of the final animal interrogated --man thinly
disguised as "the machine"--provokes this response from the
defendart man.
I am a machine. I am slave to the law of my make, I have
to obey it, under all conditions. I do nothing, of myself.
My forces are set in motion by outside influences, I never
set them ir motion myself. (p. 172)
Man. "the lowest animal," (p. 175) is a machine invested with a
terrible defect none of the other animals possess: the Moral
Sense.

Twain explained:

One Is obliged to concede that in true loftiness of
character, Man cannot claim to approach even the meanest
of the higher Animals. It Is plain that he is constitutionally
63- ,
na/k Twain, "The Damned Human Race," In Letters From the
Earth, ed. Pernard DeVoto, with a Freface by Henry Nash Smith
(R-FiTiper t Row, Publishers, Inc., n.d.; Fawcett Publishers, Inc.,
1962), P. 179. All future citations to "The Damned Human Race"
are from this volume and are referenced only in the text.
"Brooks. p. 295.
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afflicted with a Defect which must make such approach
forever impossible, for it is manifest that this defect
is permanent in him, indestructible, ineradicable.
I find this Defect to be the Moral Sense. He is the
only animal that has it. It is the secret of his degradation. It is the quality which enables him to do wrong.
It has no other function. It could never have been
intended to perform any other. Without it, man could do
no wrong. He would rise at once to the level of the
Higher Animals. . . .
. . . The Moral Sense enables a man to do wrong. It
enables him to do wrong in a thousand ways. Rabies is an
innocent disease, compared to the Moral Sense. No one,
then, can be the better man for having the Moral Sense.
What, now, do we find the Primal Curse to have been?
Plainly what it was in the beginning: the infliction upon
man of the Moral Sense; the ability to do evil; for there
can be no evil act without the presence of consciousness
of it in the doer of it. (r.. 1P1)
Though man possesses the Moral Sense, and is able to
distinguish right from wrong, it is important to notice Twain's
explanation of its "Infliction upon man" (p. 181) underscoring
the idea that man is a machine and is in bondage to his composition as a mechanism.

Therefore, Twain insisted that even

though man is a despicable, paltry, most abject animal, he is a
determined being who acts as he does because of his composition,
and hence cannot be held accountable for his cruelty, greed,
thievery, and multitudinous other vices.

As man, because of his

mechanism cannot be held accountable for atrocities he commits,
neither can he te responsible for things he has omitted doing,
according to Twain.

Rrooks says: "How much it meant to him,

itwai_n7 the thought that man is a mere machine,
—

an

irresponsitle

puppet, entitled to no demerit for what he has fallei to do!""
Twain said that the man-machine's plea of complete domination
651111d.. p. 116.
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by exterior forces Is sufficient to absolve the defendant
from charges in the animals' court:
You are discharged. Your plea is sufficient. You are a
pretty poor thing, with some good qualities and some bad
ones; but to attach personal merit to conduct emanating
from the one set, and personal demerit to conduct emanating
from the other set would he unfair and unjust. To a
machine, that is--to a machine. (p. 172)
In "The Damned Human Race," Twain presented the ideas
of the total determinism of man's life and the supposed release
from responsibility that this mechanistic control provides man.
This brief but vital essay provides a lucid introduction to
Twain's deterministic "Gospel":66

"What Is Man?".

The central theme of "What Is Man?" Is man's determinism
and position as a machine.

Twain allowed this essay to germi-

nate and grow quietly in his thinking for years before placing
it in its final written form and anonymously publishing the
explosive piece he feared to publish in his name.

Alexander E.

Jones rotes that Twain felt, at this time, that "man is n
machine, and all his actions are controlled by the workings of
another machine within, him--a mechanism which Twain refers tc
as 'Conscience,' 'Interior Monarch,' or 'Master Fassion'--which
blindly seeks to content itself at any rost."67

In "What Is Man?"

Twain stated that every area of human life Is controlled.
Whatsoever a man is, is due to his make, and to the
Influences brought to bear upon it Fricis heredities,
his habitat, his association. He is moved, directed.
COMMANDED, by exterior influences--solely. (p. 5)

66Smith

p.

171 -

67Jone-s, p. 14.
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Conscience, the "absolute Monarch inside of a man, who
is the man's Master" (pp. 20-21) is wholly the product of determinism according to Twain during this period of his thinking.
Without training, conscience is impotent.

According to Twain,

"as a guide or incentive to any authoritatively prescribed line
of morals or conduct (leaving training out of the account), a
man's conscience is totally valueless" (p. 21).

Conscience is,

said Twain, the product of a man's environment and is of itself
not able to produce correct action since it is a machine just as
man is a machine.

In 1898 Twain wrote concerning conscience:

It is a mere machine, like my heart--but moral, not physical;
and being moral is teachable, its action modifiable. It is
merely a thirg; the creature of training; it is whatever one's
mother and Pile and comrades and laws and syWm of government and habitat and heredities have made it."
Though the machine of Conscience is trainable, man still
is not to be credited for his acceptable behavior since "machines

may not boast, nor feel proud of their performance, nor claim
personal merit for it" (p. 9).

Alexander Cowie says "an obvious

corollary of this proposition is that for any 'worthy' deeds done
by a man he himself deserves no credit."69

Twain himself said:

"No machine is entitled to praise for any of its acts of a virtuous sort nor blamable for any of its acts of the opposite sort."7°
68Mark Twain's Notebook, cited by Alexander E. Jones.
"Mark Twain and the Determinism of 'What Is Man?'." American
Literature 29 (March 1957-January 199): 9.
°Alexander Cowie. The Rise of the American Novel (New
York: American Book Company. 1948). p. 616.
"Mark Twain in Eruption, cited by Alexander E. Jones.
"Mark Twain and the Determinism of 'What Is Man?'," American
pteratura 29 (March 1957-January 1958): 2.
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Justin Kaplan notes: "Without choice there can be no
responsibility, and --as if Clemens dimly perceived the logical
goal of his illogic--without responsitility guilt has no
meaning."

Jones has said that Twain may have hoped to quiet

his own tormenting conscience by proposing the mechanism of
both man and his conscience.72

Bernard DeVoto interprets "What

Is Man?" as a plea for Twain's personal pardon as well as a cry
for the pardon of the entire miserable human race:
In describing man's helplessness, it L7What Is Man?"7 pleads
that man cannot he blamed. In asserting man's cowardice,
it asserts also that man is not responsible. . . . If man is
not responsible, then no man can be held responsible. No
one, I think, can read this wearisomely repeated argument
without feeling the terrible force of an inner cry: Do not
blame me, for it was not my fault.73
Therefore, since man and his conscience are machines, and are
controlled by forces exterior to them, Twain insisted that man
should be neither praised nor tqamed for his actions.
Man's actions are basically self-centered according to
Twain: "From his cradle to his grave a man never does a single
thing which has any FIRST AND FOREMOST object but one--to secure
peace of mind, spiritual comfort, for HIMSELF" (p. 15).
Sherwood Cummings notes that In "What Is Man?" "man's impu:ses
are invariable selfish and that he is motivated by selfsatisfaction and public opinion.

Every act of apparent self-

71Kaplan. p. 140.
72Jones, p. 10.
7
3Mark Twain at Work, cited by Alexander E. Jones,
"Mark Twain and the Determinism of 'What Is Man?'." American
literature 29 (March 1957-January 1958): 10.
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sacrifice can be explained as gratification of an inner need."74
Twain simply said "a man cannot be comfortable without his own
approval" (p. 17) and stressed man's search for self-gratification.

Twain noted that "a man often honestly thinks he is

sacrificing himself merely and solely for some one else, but he
Is deceived; his bottom impulse is to content a requirement of
his nature and training, and thus acquire peace for his soul"
(p. 20).

While emphasizing man's primary drive to content

himself, Twain also discussed his belief that man's mechanical
conscience is malleable through training and can be channelled
so that other people might be benefited.

The 01d Man of the

"What Is Man?" dialogue isgued the Young Man the admonition to
direct his self-aratification in a beneficial channel.

The Old

Man advised: "Diligently train your ideals upward and still
upward toward a summit where you will find your chiefest pleasure
in conduct which, while contenting you, will be sure to confer
benefits upon your neighbor and the community" (pp. 54-55).
Twain recognized that the Master Passion or Conscience
may be trained (determined by environment), but he stressed that
Conscience "does not distinguish between good morals and bad
ones, and cares nothing for results to the man provided its own
contentment be secured; and it will always secure that" (g. 99).
According to Jones: "In other words, the human mechanism can be
trained in virtue but deserves no personal credit for riahteous

74Cummings, p. 111.
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behavior"75 since ultimately man's own good is the epitome of
all his activity and desire.
The Moral Sense is mentioned several times in "What Is
Man?".

The Moral Sense is man's ability to discern right and

wrong that distinguishes him from animals.

Twain relates that

in 1904 he removed the final chapter entitled "The Moral Sense"
from "What Is Man?".

In this chapter Twain explained man's

unilue position as judge between right and wrong, and bitterly
related man's constant choice of wrong over right.

He removed

the charter himself saying: "I couldn't even stand that chapter
myself; all the other chapters were sweet and gentle. . . . 76
Twain reserved most of his 'comment on the Moral Sense for "The
Mysterious Stranger," but in "What Is Man?" he did comment
sufficiently on the subject to strike a severe blow to man's
pride--"The fact that man knows right from wrong proves his
intellectual superiority to the other creatures; but the fact
that he can do wrong proves his moral inferiority to any creature
that cannot" (p. P9).

As William E. Davidson notes: "Eetter an

ox or a dog or a rat that has no moral sense"77 than a man that
knows to do right and does wrong.

Again here, however, it is

important to emphasize Twain's position that as a machine with
the Moral Sense, man was despicable because he chose wrong over
right, but he was a 1 3o not

to be held accountable for his actions

75Jones, r. 16.
76Mark Twain in Eruption, cited by Alexander E. Jones,
"Mark Twain and the Determinism of 'What Is Man?'," p. 3.
77William E. Davidson, "Mark Twain and Conscience,"
The Twainiar 1 (April 1942): 3.
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because he was a machine, and as such he was without control
over any phase of his life.

As the Young Man tells the Old

Man. the "desolating doctrine . . . takes the glory out of man;
it takes the pride out of him, it takes the heroism out of him,
it denies him all personal credit, all applause; it not only
degrades him to a machine, but allows him no control over the
machine" (p. 102).

The mechanistic philosophy of the Old Man

strips man of all his achievements and glories, charged the
Young Man.

The C11 Man simply replied: "He hasn't any to strip"

. 76), starkly illustrating man's depravity due to his
determined life.
Markedly similar to "What Is Man?" in perspective are
Twain's "letters From the Earth" that were not published until
1962.

In an echo of "What Is Man?" Twain proclaimed in "Letters":

The human being is a machine. An automatic machine.
It is composed of thousands of complex and delicate
mechanisms, which perform their functions harmoniously
and perfectly, in accordance with laws devised for their
governance, and over which the m§n himself has no authority, no mastership, no control •7n
In "letters" Twain again argued against man's guilt and
responsibility for his actions since he is completely determined.
To illustrate the unreasonableness of blaming a machine for its
determined activities. Twain compared the lecherous goat with
"that cold calm puritan" (p. 41) the tortoise.

Twain pleaded

for man's release from accountability because some men, like the

Mark Twain, "letters From the Earth," in Letters From
the Earth, ed. Fern/1rd DoVoto, with a Preface by Henry Nash
Smith
New York: Harper 4 Row. Publishers, Inc., n.d.; Fawcett
Publications, Inc.. 196?), p. V. All future citations to
netters" are from this volume and are referenced only in
the text.

57
goat, are endued with completely different drives than those
that are impressed on other men more temperamentally akin to
the

tortoise (pp. 40-4l).
The Moral Sense is also touched upon in "Letters."

Again paralleling the thinking of "What Is Man?" and foreshndowing "The Mysterious Stranger," Twain called the Moral Sense
that sense which differentiates man from the beast and sets
him above the beast. Instead of below the beast--where one
would suppose his proper place would be, since he is always
foul-minded and guilty and the beast always clean-minded
and innocent. It is like valuing a watch that must go wrong,
atove a watch that can't. (p. 29)
In Twain's last complete and extended essay "What Is
Mnn?" and in the posthumous publication "Letters From the Earth."
the

mechanism

of man's life and mechanical nature of the Moral

Sense or Conscience were used to strip away the veneer of man's
dignity and pride and expose him as a being wholly controlled by
heredity and environment.

Though man was seen as entirely a

product cf forces beyond his control, and therefore qualified
for freedom from responsibility for actions and behavior, Twain
still railed against the degradation of man.

He Utterly de-

nounced man's position as the lowest, most despised animal due
to his choice of wrong atove right.

The condemnation of man

because of his misuse of the Moral Sense intensifies through
"What Is Man?" and "Letters From the Earth" and devastatingly
culminates in Twain's "dark star": 79 "The Mysterious Stranger."
John S. Tuckey's article on the "scissors and paste"
construction of the Faine-Cuneka edition of "The Mysterious

79Jones, p. 1.
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Stranger' Is not only a fascinating textual study, but is also
vital when considering how faithfully the text represents
Twain's position.

At the time of Twain's death in 1910, there

were three versions of the work now known as "The Mysterious
Stranger."

Eernard DeVoto named and catalogued the three

versions as: the "Hannibal" version of 15,000 words; the
"Eseldorf" version of 55,000 words; end the "Print Shop" version of 65,000 words.

Albert P. Paine, Twain's official

tiographer and literary executor, and Frederick A. Duneka, the
general manager of Harper & Prothers publishing company, worked
together to compile the 1916 version of "The Mysterious Stranger"
from its multiple, scattered, unfinished forms among the Twain
papers.

The "Eseldorf" version was used by Paine and Duneka.

They exercised great liberties with the text, removing one
quarter of the words Twain had written for the Eseldorf version,
and entirely creating and inserting the astrologer (who was not
ever present in the "Eseldorf" manuscript) so that the astrologer
could do the evil things Twain had credited to the priest.

The

final chapter of the Paine-Duneka edition may have been written
by Twain in 1904 in Florence during Olivia Clemens' last illness,
and John Tuckey notes that there is "positive evidence that he
wrote it as a conclusion for the 'Print Shop' version.""

In

order to make the "Print Shop" conclusion fit the "Eseldorf"

"John S. Tuckey, "The Mysterious Strnnrer: Mark Twain's
Texts and the Paine-Duneka Edition," in Mark Twain's The
Mysterious Stranger and the Critics, ed. John S. Tuckey
(Pelmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 196F), p. P7.
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body of their edition, Paine and Duneka substituted the
"Eseldorf" names "Theodor" and "Satan" for the "Print Shop's"
"August" and "44."

Tuckey notes that

despite its imperfections, it is also the only existing
form of the story that has the coherence and completeness
of a realized literary work. . . . Corrupt as it is, the
Paine-Duneka edition has hell a place in our literature
for more than half a century. Generally regarded as the
most important work of Mark Twain's later years, it has
received and is receiving much critical attention.81
Henry Nash Smith also defends the Faine-Duneka edition.
Especially important is his statement that "in all versions
Mark Twain clearly intends to adopt the perspective of a
transcendent observer in order to depict human experience as
meaningless,"82 and the conCluding chapter of the 1916 version
of Paine and Duneka certainly accomplishes what Nash sees as
Twain's goal of discrediting humanity.
In 1899 Twain wrote a revealing letter to his friend,
William Dean Howells, in which he described work on his current
project now known as "The Mysterious Stranger."

Though there

are many questions surrounding "The Mysterious Stranger's"
composition and exact meaning, Twain's intention is clearly and
forcefully stated in his correspondence with

owells:

. . . What I have been wanting is a chance to write
a book without reserves--a book which should take account
of no one's feelings, and no one's prejudices, opinions,
beliefs, hopes, illusions, delusions; a book which should
say my say, right out of my heart, in the plainest language and without a limitation of any sort. I judged that
that would be an unimaginable luxury, heaven on earth.
It Is under way, now, and It is a luxury an intellectual drunk. Twice I didn't start it right; and got pretty
far in, both times, before I found it out. Put I am sure

81 Ibid.. P• 90.

"smith. p. 186.
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It is started right this time. It is in tale-form. I
believe I can make it tell what I think of Man, and how
he is constructed, and what a shabby poor ridiculous thing
he is, and how mistaken he is in his estilate of his
character and powers and lualities and his place among
the animals. . . .
I hope it will take me a year or two to write it, and
that it will turn out to be the right vessel to contain
all the abuse I am planning to dump into it.83
Twain's interpretation of his own purpose in writing
"The Mysterious Stranger" is vital.

The clear-cut precision of

Twain's intent is central in assessing various critical approaches to this complex work.

Pernard DeVoto believed "The

Mysterious Stranger" resulted from the multiple tragedies that
befell Twain's personal life during the 1890's, and Twain's
salvation of himself developed when the conclusion of "The
Mysterious Stranger" exploded the world in which he lived.
If he were to go on functioning, he must convince his
"trained Presbyterian conscience" that he was not to
blame for these sorrows. He exhausted every conceivable
excuse, even that offered by his "gospel" of determinism,
but none of them would serve. There remained one last
possibility. "If everything was a dream, then clearly the
accused prisoner must be discharged." He saved himself
by detonating the moral unive7-se.P4
John S. Tuckey interpreted Twain's solipsism--a belief
that the self Is the only reality--as a way out of the mechanism
surrounding man--a way the soul or "me" of mar could foil the
universe and survive.

Tuckey saw the conclusion of "The

Mysterious Stranger" as Twain's final position of being "not

83 Mark Twain's letters, vol. 2, cited by E. S. Fussell,
"The Structural Problem of 'The Mysterious Stranger'," Studies
In Philology 49 (January 1952): 96.
k4Pernard DeVoto, cited by Edward Wagenknecht, Cavalcade
of the American Novel: From the Firth of the Nation to the
Middle of the Twentieth Century (New York: Holt. Rinehart, and
Winston, 1952), p. 124.
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confirmed in despair, not barred from seeing and representing
human life as having value and significance."85

Coleman 0.

Parsons also saw ambiguity In Twain's solipsistic final chapter
calling the conclusion "one of his final words, for he liked
to have two such words--a hopeful and a hopeless one."86
E. S. Fussell noted that "certain values and a limited dignity
emerge"87 in the bleakness of "The Mysterious Stranger."
Twain methodIcRlly destroyed every vestige of human
freedom and dignity in progressive degrees throughout his works
and codified his determinism in his self-styled "gospel" "What
Is Man?".

Did he then conclude "The Mysterious Stranger,"

wherein he demolished completely the Moral Sense (or conscience)
of man, on an ambiguous or hopeful note?

The answer, chilling

though it Is, is found in Twain's own words.

His intention in

"The Mysterious Stranger" was to present "a book which should
say my say, right out of my heart, in the plainest language and
88
without a limitation of any sort,"
and the language and ideas
of the work are plainly and honestly bleak, deterministic, and
pessimistic.

Therefore, based on Twain's stRted objectives in

writing "The Mysterious Stranger" and the destructive nature of
the work's conclusion, one may firmly assert that Twain's concluding thoughts in the work represent a bleak but logical

85John S. Tuckey. "Mark Twain's later Dialogue: The 'Me'
and the Machine," American Literature 41: 542.
86
Parsons, "The Devil and Samuel Clemens," p. 603.
87E. S. Fussell, "The Structural Problem of 'The Mysterious
Stranger'," Studies In Philology 49 (January 1952): 104.
88Mark Twain's Letters, vol. 2, cited by E. S.
Fussell,
"The Structural Froblem of 'The Mysterious Stranger'," p. 96.
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end of his ideas as they developed throughout his life and
his writing.
"The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg" represents Twain's
last protrayal of any struggle between determined man and his
conscience.

The conscience that grieves the Richards is already

determined and while still able to produce remorse, is
in producing correct behavior.

impotent

In "The Damned Human Race,"

"What Is Man?," and "letters From the Earth" conscience is not
only determined, but like man, is labelled a machine.

The

struggle of Hucli Finn or Tom Sawyer is no longer possible, for
every favorable attribute of man, from his freedom to his sound
heart, has been removed by Twain.

The final blow Twain de-

livered was to the Moral Sense man claims as his unique and
elevating quality among the animals.

"The Mysterious StranRer"

provided Twain with a vehicle to display and destroy the value
of the Moral Sense, for it was man's Moral Sense that "curdled
Samuel Clemens' milk of human kindness."89
Parsons notes that for "The Mysterious Stranger" "the
character Twain needed as a mouthpiece must combine . . . moral
ambivalence (i.e., freedom) with lancet-sharp critirism."90
Satan, the mysterious stranger known as Philip Traum (Cream) by
Eseldorf's (Ass Town) inhabitants, is untainted by human moral
values, and readily provides revealing commentary on the human
race.

Satan's amoral nature is displayed as he explained to

"Parsons, "The Devil and Samuel Clemens." p. 51
'
19.
90
Coleman C. Parsons. "The Packground of 'The Mysterious
Stranger'," American literature 32 (March 1960): 61.
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the three boys he "tutored" (Theodor, Seppi, and Nikolaus)
the position of the angels that did not fall with young Satan's
famous uncle of the same name: "We others are still iRnorant of
sin; we are not able to commit it; we are without blemish, and
shall abide in that estate always. . . . We cannot do wrong;
neither have we any disposition to do it, for we do not know
what it is."91

Satan's distinction from mar is unmistakable as

he tells the boys: "I am not limited like you.
to human conditions.

I am not subject

I can measure and understand your human

weaknesses, for I have studied them; but I have none of them"
(p. 23).

Satan's opinion of the race he had studied is also

vividly apparent.

Theodor "relates his and his companions'

knowledge of Satan's impression of man:
And always when he was talking about men and women here
on the earth and their doings--even their grandest and
sublimest--we were secretly ashamed, for his manner showed
that to him they and their doings were of paltry poor
consequence; often you would think he was talking about
flies, If you didn't know. Once he even said, in so many
words, that our people down here were quite interesting to
him, notwithstanding they were so dull and ignorant and
trivial and conceited, and so diseased and rickety, and such
a shabby, poor, worthless lot all around. . . .
. . . He always spoke of men in the same old indifferent
way--just as cne speaks of bricks and manure piles and such
things; you could see that they were of no consequence to
him, one way or the other. He didn't mean to hurt us, you
could see that; just as we don't mean to insult a trick when
we disparage it; a trick's emotions are nothing to us; it
never occurs to us to think whether it has any or not.
(pp. 19; 25)
When Satan was replying to Theodor's inquiry on why the
Angel made such a distinction between himself and man, Satan

91Mark Twain, "The Mysterious Stranger," in The Mysterious
Stranger and Cther Stories (New York: Harper & Prothers
Publishers, 1922), p. 1 4'. All future citations tc "The
Mysterious Stranger" are from this volume and are referenced only
in the text.
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replied that man "has the Moral Sense" (p. 26).

Not fully

understanding the meaning of the term, Theodor asked Father
Peter to explain what the Moral Sense was.

After his initial

shock. Father Peter replied that the Moral Sense "is the
faculty which enables us to distinguish good from evil"

(p. 33).

Still not satisfied with his grasp of the term, Theodor asked
if the Moral Sense was valuable.
answer to the question

WAS:

Father Peter's startled

"Valuable?

heavens, lad, it is the

one thing that lifts man above the beasts that perish and makes
him heir to immortality!" (p. 34).

Father Peter's statement on

the value of the Moral Sense, however, was soon ironically
destroyed.

Parsons rotes that a primary tenet in Twain's credo

at this time was the utter worthlessness of man, and similar to
Swift's comparison of man and animals, Twain's assessment is
weighted entirely toward the animals, in inversion of Father
Peter's view.92

When Satan and Theodor viewed the inquisition

of a "heretic," Theodor was appalled and remarked to Satan
about the brutality of the torture chamber scene they had just
witnessed.

In reply to Theodor's assessment of the actions as

brutal, Satar caustically replied:
"No, it was a human thing. You should not insult the
brutes by such a misuse of that word; they have rot
deserved it," and he went on talking like that. "It is
like your paltry race--always lying, always claiming virtues which it hasn't got, always denying them to the
higher animals, which alone possess them. No brute ever
does a cruel thing --that is the monopoly of those with the
Moral Sense. When a brute inflicts pain he does it innocently; it is not wrong; for him there is no such thing as
wrong. And he does not inflict pair for the pleasure of
inflicting it--only man does that. Inspired by that

92Parsons, "Packground," v. 69.
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A sense whose function is to
mongrel Moral Sense of hiss
and
wrong, with liberty to choose
between
right
distinguish
Now
what advantage can he get
do.
which of them he will
out of that? He is always choosing, and in nine cases out
of ten he prefers the wrong. There shouldn't be any wrong;
and without the Moral Sense there couldn't be any. And
yet he is such an unreasoning creature that he is not able
to perceive that the Moral Sense degrades him to the bottom
layer of animated beings and is a shameful possession.
(pp. 50-51)
To further illustrate man's depravity due to his possession of the Moral Sense, Satan took Theodor to a factory in
a French hamlet.

The men, women, and children who labored in

terrible working conditions fourteen hours each day for a pittance
also lived in unspeakable filth and disease.

Satan uses this

opportunity to again strike out against man and his Moral Sense.
It is the factory operators' Moral Sense that teaches them the
difference between right and wrong, and the human debris of the
factory town is the result.

In the face of his treatment of his

fellow man, man has the audacity, says Satan, to present himself
as superior to the animals who would never treat another animal
so cruelly.

Satan cries: "Ah, you are such an illogical,

unreasoning race:

And paltry--oh, unspeakably!" (p. 53).

The

mechanism of man that renders him so odious does not now point
to man's release from responsibility because of moral and biological determinism as did the argument in "What Is Man?".
Instead, man's determinism, that includes his possession of the
Moral Sense, simply renders him a "suffering-machine and a
happiness-machine combined" (p. 77) that positions him as a
michine morally and biologically; the Moral Sense merely underscores his depravity.

Satan. echoing Twain's view of man during

this final period of his thinking, was merciless toward man whom
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he knew to be determined and completely controlled by exterior
forces, yet whom he despised thoroughly.

Theodor notes: "Satan

could be cruelly offensive when he chose; and he always chose
when the human race was brought to his attention.

He always

turned up his nose at it, and never had a kind word for it"
(p. 62).
The ultimate conclusion of Satan's line of reasoning
appears in the final chapter of "The Mysterious Stranger."

The

idea of the absolute worthlessness of human existence that Twain
arrived at in this last step in his long progression of thinking
on man is revealed in Satan's last words to Theodor.
It is true, that which I have revealed to you; there
is no God, no universe, no human race, no earthly life,
no heaven, no hell. It is all a dream--a grotesque and
foolish dream. Nothing exists but you. And you are but a
thought--a vagrant thought, a useless thought, a homeless
thought, wandering forlorn among the empty eternities:
(p. 140)
Parsons notes that Twain's "thought was not constructive
but destructive, its end being exculpation and

protection, its

means negation of free will, conscience, and finally life
itself."93

These negations rendered the entire scheme of life

and reality ridiculous since responsibility is a farce when
nothing else exists.

The colossal joke on mar is that there is

no joke--but there is also no laughing, for as Theodor said at
the conclusion of Satan's final words: "He vanished, and left me
nnpnlled; for I knew, and realized, that all he had said
true" (p. 14n).

931
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Twain's mechanism had led him to its ultimate limit:
the "vagrant," "useless," "homeless," thought of man awash in
an empty abyss.

Iike Yacbeth's evaluation of life as "a tale

told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing,"94
Twain similarly concluded that man's existence was absurd and
absolutely void of meaning.

94Macbeth 5.5.25-27.

CONCLUSION
William Dean Howells notes in My Mark Twain that
for Twain
all life seems, when he began to find it out, to have the
look of a vast joke, whether the joke was on him or on his
fellow-beings, or if it may be expressed without irreverence,
on their common creator. But it was never wholly a joke,
and it was not long before his literature began to own its
pathos.95
Certainly a study of the progression in Twain's thinking as he
attempted to reconcile the notion of man's having moral prerogatives and responsibilities with the mechanistic concept of his
being controlled by external forces bears out Howells' statement
on the increasing poignancy exhibited in Twain's writings.
Twain initially began wrestling with the issue of man's determinism
and moral responsibility with a discussion of socially engrained
standards of right and wrong.

These moral standards tend to

shape what man calls his conscience, which in reality can be
either a manifestation of ethical standards or simply a statement
of local prejudice.

Then Twain recognized the determinism of

social values while he insisted on the ability of the sound
heart to emerge victorious over trained concepts of right and
wrong.

In his final stage, Twain viewed man and his conscience

95Wi11iam Dean Howells, My Mark Twain: Reminiscences and
Criticism, with an Introduction 1-y Marilyn Austin Baldwin
(Eaton Rouse: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 156.
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(socially engrained values) as mechanistic, the influence of
the sound heart inoperative, and man's struggle in an indifferent
universe as meaningless and al-.surd.

Through the course of his

works, Twain's writing became increasingly pessimistic.

Was

Twain finally, therefore, a bitter misanthrope who shook his
fist in the face of God and his universe, cried "unfair." ard
vented his hostility through his powerful and merciless pen?
Cr, was Twain, as some contend, from first to last primarily and
ultimately a comic who took nothing, including life, seriously?
Neither of the preceding assessments of Twain are entirely
true.

Howells says that for one view to predominate to the

exclusion of the opposite position would he an unrepresentative
and tragic view of Twain as only humorist or only pessimist.96
Twain undeniably was a profound humorist.

For humor to be

effective, the humorist must be sensitive to man's activities
that yield humorous incidents while he must also have insight
into man's follies and foibles.

This sensitivity to human na-

ture led Twain through the three stages of his thinking on
conscience and determinism, and lodged Twain finally in the bleak
pessimism of nis late years and final works.

The prompting of

the sound heart of Twain's magnificent central Huckleberry Finn
period seemed less and less effectual in Twain's later works
influenced by his heightened sensitivity to man's weaknesses and
vulnerability to circumstances beyond his control.

With the

decline of the sound heart's Influence, according to Twain's
thinking, came also man's increasing lack of control over his

96Ibid., pp. 160-62.
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life and actions.

As man's self-governing ability decreased,

Twain's pessimism increased.

The growth of the darkening

strands of Twain's increasing disillusionment with humanity
may be traced in his succession of works where he maneuvers man
from a being guided by social training (conscience), to the
heights of the victory of Huck Finn's sound heart, then plunges
him into the foreboding realms of mechanism, determinism, and
nothingness in the late Twain works.
Twain was influenced by two major outlooks of his time:
the traditional Puritan, Calvinistic view of man as morally
responsible even in a predestined scheme and the mid -nineteenth
century scientific, evolutionary Darwinian view of man as an
amoral machine.

Although Twain accepted the idea of the

mechanistic control to which man was unavoidably subject, he
rejected the consequent amorality of the new science and clung
to his belief in man's conscience or moral responsibility.
Twain could never reconcile the rolarity between his belief in
man's moral responsibility or conscience and his subscription
to impersonal, external control or mechanistic determinism.

Only

through the extremity of "The Mysterious Stranger" and its
complete denial of life and its meaning could this conflict be
otliterated.
It was Twain's position as a scientific, mechanistic
determinist with a profound and penetrating view of mankind that
propelled him to the extreme pessimism of scientific determinism
that he may have abhorred personally.

Gamaliel Pradford wrote

of Twain: "No man ever more abused the s'uman heart, or railed at
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'A-le hollowness of human affection, and

friends or loved more."97

no man ever had more

Similarly, howells said of his

life-long friend: "One could not know him well without realizing
him the most serious, the most humane, the most conscientious
of mer."98
No more succinct description of the position of Twain
in American literature may be found than in two lines from
Howells' poem to Twain: "The American Joke."

In calling Twain's

literary creation a mighty Colossus on display for Old World
and America alike, Howells may describe Twain's view of mankind:
One eye winked in perpetual eclipse,
Ir the other a huge tear of pity stood.9
These views are not presented in an attempt to "tone down"
or "soften" Twain's dark appraisal of humanity, for his evaluation was lengthy, methodic, and

clearly stated.

However, behind

the scathing pen responsible for stripping away the sham veneers
man is so fond of constructing was the sensitive, tender,
impressionable man, Mark Twain, who viewed mankind frankly,
bitterly, penetratingly, and sorrowfully.

He recognized with

contempt what mankind is; he recognized with regret what mankind
might have )
- een.

Rather than being a butcher that displayed the

malignant corpse of the civilization he condemned, Mark Twain
stands instead as a surgeon who exposed the corruption and

97Gamaliel !radford, cited by Edward Wagenknecht,
Mark Twain: The Man and His Work (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1971), p. 121.

98

My Mark Twain, cited by Milton Hickels, "Samuel Clemens
and the Conscience of Comedy," Southern Review 4 (April 1968):

561.
99Howells, p. 163.
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and disease of his patient, but who revealed raw nerves with
a profundity of insight and common bond of humanity few
writers have equalled or excelled.
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